CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA - VOLUME VII


Thursday, the 30th December 1948

Sir, the other matter that I have suggested is not anabsolute one. I have only suggested that not less than two-thirds of the members of the Council of Ministers should atany time be members of the House of the People. The House of the People should obviously have a greater importance, sincea vote of confidence in that body alone would sustain theMinistry. That being so, the presence of a considerablemajority of Ministers in that House is I think of the utmostimportance. The other House, being an equal partner orconcurrent in most of the functions of ParlI ament, itfollows that body should also have a certain number ofMinisters present therein, who would be able to explain theGovernment point of view or the Ministry's point of view tothat body. Therefore I have suggested that not less thantwo-thirds should be present in the Lower House, and notmore than one-third in the Upper House or the Council ofStates. This also corresponds roughly with the membership,under this Constitution, of the House of the People and of the Council of States respectively. I, therefore, think that particularamendment also should not in any way be objected to.

The point further that Ministers, whatever they callthemselves, should be entitled to assistance by way ofParlI amentary Secretaries and Deputy Ministers is a matterof convenience in parlI amentary procedure. It is necessarythat, by the mere absence or inability to attend for anyMinister owing to overcrowded time with public business for the Chief or any other Ministers, it may not happen that the House has in it no one to explain the Ministry's point ofview in regard to any matter that is coming before the House. The Constitution should accordingly provide for orfacilitate the appointment of such parlI amentary assistanceas is contemplated in this clause of my amendment in theshape of Deputy Ministers or ParlI amentary Secretaries asthey may be called.

Obviously these Ministers would not be Ministers of thesame rank as the Chief or Cabinet Ministers. They should beexpressly and clearly declared by the Constitution to beonly aides, or assistants, to the Cabinet Ministers incharge of the various departments of State. But theirappointment must be specifically provided for in the Constitution, and not be left to the exigency of the momentfor a particular Ministry.

The number and the exact functions of these assistantMinisters may be determined by ParlI ament from time to time,so that these appointments would not be a mere matter ofexecutive decree which ParlI ament need not confirm, or maynot be required to confirm.

The doctrine of collective responsibility that thisarticle is based upon would require, in my opinion, that thevote of confidence of the House should be available for eachnew appointment, and also for the collective Ministry aswell when first appointed; and if the vote is notforthcoming, the Minister or the Ministry, should resign anda new one appointed in his or its place.

Lastly, Sir, is the question of rectitude of theMinisters concerned in their official duties. On an earlieroccasion; while dealing with the President. I had the honourof making the suggestion that the President should declareall his right, title and interest in any business, property,trade or industry, that he may have held or carried onbefore election; and that such right, title, etc., should beeither sold or be disposed of; or should be made over to beheld in trust by the Government during the period that heholds the office of President. I was told, Sir, at that timethat the President being more or less a figurehead orornamental chief executive of the State, as he would have nopowers which may at all injure the interests of the State,it would be unnecessary to compel him to disclose his right,title and interest, to require the same to be disposed or tobe made over to the Government to be held in trust for himduring his term of office. At that time I was further toldthat if such a suggestion were made in regard to

theexecutive authority proper, viz., the Ministry, then perhapsit may be considered.

I am not so foolish as to believe that this veryguarded statement--I cannot call it an assurance,--would bestrictly acted upon, particularly as I have the misfortuneto put forward that idea. Taking, however, the Draftsman tobe also the spokesman in this matter, may I venture toremind him of his very guarded and carefully wordedassurance--I would hardly call it an assurance--or theobservation that he had made, and ask him to consider thisquestion favourably at least at this stage; and to seewhether, if not in my words, at least in some other words,some such assurance may be given so that the Ministers, thereal executive heads of the country, may be free fromtemptation, and may devote themselves exclusively to theinterests of the country, without thinking of themselves orof their families. I hope this amendment will be accepted.

Mr. Vice-President: There is an amendment to thisamendment. No. 46 in the name of Mr. Kamath.

Shri. H. V. Kamath: Mr. Vice-President, Sir, I move:

"That in amendment No. 1300 of the List of amendments,in the proposed new clause (2E), all the words occurringafter the words `moral turpitude' be deleted."

My Friend, Prof. Shah, has just moved amendment No.1300 comprising five sub-clauses. I dare say neither Dr.Ambedkar nor any of my other honourable Friends in thisHouse will question the principle which is sought to beembodied in Clause (2E) of amendment No. 1300 moved by Prof.Shah. I have suggested my amendment No. 46 seeking to deleteall the words occurring after the words "moral turpitude"because I think that bribery and corruption are offenceswhich involve moral turpitude. I think that moral turpitudecovers bribery, corruption and many other cognate offencesas well. Sir, my friends here will, I am sure, agree with methat it will hardly redound to the credit of any governmentif that government includes in its fold any minister who hashad a shady past or about whose character or integrity thereis any widespread suspicion. I hope that no such event oroccurrence will take place in our country, but some of therecent events have created a little doubt in my mind. Irefer, Sir, to a little comment, a little article, whichappeared in the Free Press Journal of Bombay dated the 8thSeptember 1948 relating to the *** Ministry. The relevantportion of the article runs thus:

"The Cabinet (the * * * * Cabinet) includes one personwho is a convicted blackmarketeer, and although it is saidthat his disabilities, resulting from his conviction in aCourt of Law, which constituted a formidable hurdle in theway of his inclusion in the interim Government, weregraciously removed by the Maharaja."

Mr. Vice-President: I did not hear you. Otherwise I would not have allowed you to quote any names.

Shri H. V. Kamath: I am only reading from a writtenarticle in a paper.

Mr. Vice-President: I am helpless now. I would not haveallowed you to give the name of the State but I would haveallowed you to read the extract.

SHRI H. V. KAMATH: "Although the disabilities weregraciously removed by the Maharaja, how can the publicforgive and forget his sin against society? How can aGovernment, having in their fold such elements, be called apopular Government? Inclusion of such elements, apart frombeing a mockery of democracy would blot out the prestige ofGovernment, and would consequently fail at its veryinception to create enthusiasm and confidence in the publicmind. Will this anomaly be rectified before it is too late?'

I do not know if this was absolutely justified but thento give even a handle to newspapers writing in this fashionabout any Ministry or any Government is certainly notcreditable to the Government nor is it in the publicinterest. I do not know whether this anomaly was rectifiedlater on. I hope that it will be a disqualification imposedon any prospective Minister of any State or in the CentralGovernment of our country.

It may be argued that this particular amendment has noplace here and we might as well

prescribe thisdisqualification in article 83 which relates to thedisqualifications of a member of the House of the People,because a Minister will be chosen from among the Members of the House of the People, but there is one difficulty in this matter, which I would request Dr. Ambedkar to clear in thecourse of his reply to this debate. Article 83 as it stands,includes no disqualification of this nature. There is anomnibus sub-clause in it which reads:

"(a) if he is so disqualified by or under any law madeby ParlI ament."

Certainly I visualise the possibility, may, thecertainty of ParlI ament prescribing variousdisqualifications, but certainly that ParlI ament willassemble after the elections under the New Constitution,after perhaps Ministries have been formed in the States andin the Centre, and therefore, if article 83 does notspecifically lay down the disqualifications for the Membersof the House of the People or the Ministers, we cannot becertain that certain persons who have been guilty or whohave been suspected of certain offences will be excludedfrom the membership of a Cabinet in a State or at theCentre, because ParlI ament if it takes cognizance of thisparticular aspect of the matter, after Governments have beenformed in the State and at the Centre, will certainly meetand pass a law, but that will be subsequent to the formationof the Government in the States and in the Centre.Therefore, at the very inception or initiation of thisConstitution, we must have provision in this regard imposingdisqualifications with regard to the Members of State orthe Central Cabinets.

I, therefore, Sir, move this amendment to the effectsupporting Prof. K. T. Shah's amendment, [the last part ofit, (2E) of 1300] and I move that the words occurring afterthe words "moral turpitude" be deleted, because their importis comprised in the words "moral turpitude".

Mr. Vice-President: Before I call upon the next Memberwho has an amendment in his name, I would like to have the permission of the House to this effect that in our officialproceedings when the extract from that paper occurs, thename of the State should be represented by stars. Is the necessary permission given? It would look more dignified. We have got to keep up the prestige of this House and that isone way of doing it.

Shri H. V. Kamath: I have no objection.

Mr. Tajamul Husain: No one has any objection.

Mr. Vice-President: Thank you.

(Amendment No. 1301 was not moved.)

Mr. Vice-President: The article is now open for generaldiscussion.

(To Shri Mahavir Tyagi) There are a large number ofMembers who want to speak, and I therefore ask you to be asbrief as possible.

Shri Mahavir Tyagi (United Provinces: General): Mr.Vice-President, Sir, I do not want to take more time of thisHouse, but I would like to point out one thing. Myhonourable Friend, Mr. Mahboob Ali Baig has suggested that the Cabinet should be elected by the House on the basis of the single transferable vote system. It seems to be quite agood thing to use such high sounding words everywhere, butmy friend forgets that it was to avoid the evil of two orthree or, as my friend suggests, fifteen minds workingseparately in a Cabinet that we had to undertake such atremendous sacrifice. The country had only recently theexperience of a cabinet in which there were two partiesworking together. If the Cabinet were not so evilly composedby the British, we should not have partitioned India intotwo. We have given away the best and the most precious partof our land, and have separated willingly. We have obtainedthis unanimity in the Cabinet at a very great price indeed,and at a very great cost. Thousands of our friends andcitizens of this country were killed and massacred on theother side, and thousands of equally good people, who werequite innocent, were killed on this side too. After all thathas happened and after this bitter and bloody experience ofours, does my friend still insist on composing a cabinet inwhich there will be so many parties represented? Anelection, by the single transferable vote, means that anyman

who has 30 votes at his command will come into theCabinet which deals with the highest priority secrets of theState; it decides upon budgets; it has so many treaties and other important functions to perform. Do you mean tosuggest that as many parties as there are in the Houseshould all come into the Cabinet, so that they may neverdecide an issue or keep a secret? Are we going to throwourselves into such a chaotic condition as to have a Cabinetwhich will not be of one mind? Sir, I do not want to dilateon it. The House understands that no Cabinet can live evenfor a day if all the members of the Cabinet are not of onemind.

Then again, my honourable Friend, Prof. K. T. Shahpurpose that whenever a Minister is appointed by thePremier, he should seek the vote of confidence of the House.Although obviously this is true, like the Premier all otherMinisters must also have the confidence of the House, butthen again, there is one point slightly finer and that is ifevery member of the Cabinet is required to seek votes forhimself or is put to trial on the first day he is appointed.It will mean that only such persons will be Ministers aswill have their own followings and personal parties in the House. Such a minister will have a tendency to keep hispersonal party always alive and active and aloof. In factwhen a Minister comes and joins a Cabinet, he merges hiswhole self, and all his influence into the Cabinet. He hasno voice of his own; he speaks the voice of the Premier andacts according to the decisions of the Cabinet. In theCabinet he has no personal entity left because he becomesabsolutely one with the whole Cabinet. If there are 15ministers, every one of them becomes an indivisible part of the whole Cabinet. The Premier speaks for himself and hisCabinet, and the Ministers for the Cabinet and the Premier.So under these conditions if the amendment of Prof. K. T.Shah is accepted it will virtually mean that the Premierwill be on trial whenever another Minister is appointed. it is always a vote of confidence in the Premier. The House canappoint only one Premier. And once a Premier is appointed,he then takes into his Cabinet colleagues of his own choicewith whom he can share all the secrets and responsibilitiesof the State.

How can he allow every Minister to keep a separatecircle of his own personal influence in the House? If theMinisters will have such sort of relationships with theMembers, the Cabinet will be open to all sorts ofcorruption, because no one can keep a number of membersalways ready to back him as his pocket Borough, unless hetries to appease them. It is always unhealthy andundemocratic that Ministers should be allowed to retain their own small influences in the House. In a democracy, it is the majority party which is given the power to rule, toadminister. The majority party decides upon Premier, becausethe wish of the whole country is that such and such a partywill rule. The Cabinet therefore has to be loyal to themajority party which has the mandate of the people to runthe Government on their behalf. The administration shall berun on the lines of the manifesto which has been approved bythe general electorate. Therefore, I submit that the Cabinetmust be of one mind, and it could be of one mind only whenall the members come through the Premier and look upto himand not to the House for their sanction. They must bepopular in the House; but they must be popular to bringstrength to the Premier, to bring strength to the party andnot popular individually. Every Minister pools his personalstrength, influence and following together with hiscolleagues completely, and thus enjoys the loyalty of anddraws his strength from a much bigger group of members in the House. I therefore submit that both these amendmentswill stultify the whole fabric of democratic Constitution.This type of group-cabinet has nowhere been tried so far. Itherefore press that both the amendments must be opposed onprinciple and I oppose the amendments.

Mr. Vice-President: Mr. Raj Bahadur from Matsya Union.I would request you to be brief because there are a

numberof Members who want to speak.

Mr. Tajamul Husain: Five minutes to each, Sir.

Shri Raj Bahadur (United States of Matsya): Mr. Vice-President, Sir, I join my honourable Friend Shri MahavirTyagi, in opposing the amendment that has been moved by Mr.Mahboob Ali Baig. Mr. Mahboob Ali Baig has put forward anamendment which unfortunately shows a tendency on the partof some of the Members in this House to get back somehow thespirit of separatism and division by one method or another.It is unfortunate that despite the generous attitude that the Congress party as the majority party has shown towardsall the minority parties in general and the Muslim minorityin particular, such like things should come in. I see withinand behind the lines of this amendment a devise to introducethe evil of communalism and separatism by the back-doormethod. (Hear, hear)

I submit that Mr. Mahboob Ali Baig has advanced threemain arguments in favour of his amendment. Firstly, he saysthat ParlI amentary democracy is an evil and it is nodemocracy at all. I am surprised to hear such a categoricalstatement made on the floor of this House. We know thatParlI amentary democracy has been on the anvil of experienceduring the course of three hundred years in one country atleast, and we also know that leaving certain notableexceptions almost all the countries of the world are todaytrying to achieve and progress towards the attainment ofParlI amentary democracy. It is too late in the day thereforeto curse ParlI amentary democracy as an evil. He says that it would be unfortunate, if a majority of sixty per cent shouldbe allowed to rule one hundred per cent of the population. I would submit that all acts in human society have got to bejudged and decided on the principle of "summum bonum",greatest good or the greatest number, and that judgment ofdecision could be made by the electorate as such on thebasis of majority of votes only. To say that the type ofdemocracy that obtains in Switzerland would suit outrequirements is not to state the whole truth at all. Norwould it be a sound proposition. We know that in Switzerlandthree distinct nationalities, German, French and Italiancombined together in a confederacy. It was done in order tosuit the exigencies of their own situation. I would submitthat the type of democracy in Switzerland would not suit ourrequirements at all. We have had some taste of it in thedays when the Muslim League Party, through the "goodoffices" of Lord Wavell entered into a sort of coalitionwith the Congress Party. What ensued thereupon is recenthistory. We know how from top to bottom the virus ofseparatism and communalism permeated the rank and file of the services and the entire body politic. We know howdifficult it became to make any progress. We know how wecould not execute or implement any schemes of policies. Theresult of all this was that the country had to bepartitioned. We are not going to repeat the same experimentagain. I would submit in the end that it is only meet andproper that we should cast away our prejudices and bias, ifany, against the unity or the unification of the country.With these words, I oppose the amendment that has been putforth by my honourable Friend Mr. Mahboob Ali Baig.

Mr. Tajamul Husain: Sir, I shall be very brief in mystatement. I take up first amendment number 1294 moved by myhonourable Friend Mr. Mahboob Ali Baig. Now, article 61says: "There shall be a Council of Ministers with the PrimeMinister at the head to aid and advise the President in theexercise of his functions." Mr. Mahboob Ali Baig's amendmentis that there shall be fifteen Ministers and secondly, that they should be elected in accordance with the system ofproportional representation by means of the singletransferable vote. He does not mention that the PrimeMinister will be the head of this Cabinet. These are histhree main objections to this article. I do not agree with the amendment of my honourable Friend Mr. Mahboob Ali Baig.(Hear, hear). The first point is that he wants the number ofMinisters to be fixed in the Constitution. How can we

fix the number? He wantsfifteen Ministers. Suppose we require only ten, what are weto do with the other five? Suppose we require twenty, wecannot appoint them. Therefore, I say, Sir, that it isabsurd to fix the number of Ministers in the Consitution.There is no Constitution in the whole world which fixes thenumber of Ministers. It is for the ParlI ament, it is for theCabinet itself to find out how many Ministers are requiredfor the work.

As regards proportional representation, Sir, what wouldbe the result? Article 61 contemplates that after thegeneral election, the party which is in a majority willelect its leader and that leader will be called upon by thePresident or the Governor-General, whoever he may be, toform the Ministry. He will be called the Chief Minister orthe Prime Minister and he will submit the names to thePresident. If you have, Sir, election by means of the singletransferable vote and proportional representation, a man maybe elected who does not see eye to eye with the majorityparty. What will happen then? Every country wants a smoothworking of the Constitution, (Interruption) in day to dayworking. I submit that it would be absurd. Then, you musthave Coalition Government every time whether a particularparty is in the majority or not.

In England you had a Coalition Ministry. Because at onetime when the Labour Party came to power they had not anabsolute majority on account of the existence of otherparties--the Liberals and Conservatives--and they formedCoalition Ministry for the purposes of the First Great Warand the Second Great World War. But to have CoalitionMinistry everyday is absurd. Therefore I oppose this. Thenext amendment is of Prof. Shah who does not want that thePrime Minister should be the Head. Everywhere PrimeMinisters are the Head. So I oppose this. The Article says--

"There shall be a Council of ministers with the PrimeMinister at the head to aid and advise the President in theexercise of his functions."

My friend says the Prime Minster shall not be at theHead. I don't agree, Sir. In England the Prime Minister isthe Head. This is the English system and it has been workingsatisfactorily for a number of years. My friend says that there is no mention of it in their Constitution but I submitthat they never had a Constituent Assembly. The Constitutionevolved itself. They did not have a Prime Minister in thosedays. It gradually grew and they found that the office of the Prime Minister at the head of the Cabinet was absolutelyessential and they have got him now and it is working quitesatisfactorily and it is right to have it under our.Constitution also. Therefore I oppose that amendment also.

Now I come to No. 1297 by Mr. Tahir. Sir, the articlesays that the Council of Ministers will advise thePresident. The amendment says:

"Except in so far as he is by or under thisConstitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion."

Sir, I do not accept this.

Kazi Syed Karimuddin (C. P. and Berar: Muslim): Is hereplying on behalf of Dr. Ambedkar?

Mr. Tajamul Husain: Sir, I am not replying on behalf ofDr. Ambedkar or anybody else. I am speaking what actually Ifeel should be done. I have supported many amendments movedby Dr. Ambedkar and I have opposed many amendments moved byhim. My friend Mr. Karimuddin never opposed any amendment ofDr. Ambedkar, but I did. So it does not mean that I amsupporting Dr. Ambedkar. I do not know which amendment Dr.Ambedkar is

going to accept. If my friend Mr. Karimuddin knowsbeforehand what is going to be accepted by Dr. Ambedkar,then he must be in the confidence of Dr. Ambedkar.

Mr. Vice-President: Order, order. Mr. Tajamul Husain,if I were there, I would not mind this kind of interruption.You go on with your speech and do not mind the observationsof your friends.

Mr. Tajamul Husain: I will go on with my speech; butsometimes one has to reply to baseless allegations. I amsorry I am taking more time of the House that I ought tohave. Now I come to No. 1297 by Mr. Tahir. He wants thatwhen the President wants to exercise

his individualdiscretion, then the Cabinet shall not give him advice. Sir,I oppose this one also. We do not want the President or theGovernor to use his individual discretion at all. In thoseday when the British were here they wanted to safeguardtheir own interest under the Government of India Act, 1935.That was absolutely necessary under that Act to check theCongress Ministries in their opinion, but now every thinghas changed. His Majesty the King of England does notexercise his individual discretion at all. He merely followsthe advice tendered by the Cabinet. If he does not acceptthe advice, he must go and not the Cabinet. Ultimately hewill have to go. Therefore we have been mostly following theBritish Constitution--I think that there should be noquestion of individual discretion at all. If advice istendered by the Cabinet, the President must accept that.Now, amendment No. 1298.

Mr. Vice-President: That will be blocked if 1297 isrejected and so you need not touch upon it.

Mr. Tajamul Husain: I now come to Prof. Shah'samendment. His first amendment is that every time theMinister or the Prime Minister is appointed or elected asthe case may be, he should seek a vote of confidence fromthe House. This is a novel procedure. I have not heardanywhere that such procedure is being adopted. A new man hascome; you must give him a trial. If you find after a timethat he is not working to your liking, remove him. But why,every time the Prime Minister is appointed, should he bebrought before the House and ask for a vote of confidence?This should not be accepted. His amendment No. 2 is thatevery minister must be an elected member of either House andif he is not, he should seek election within six months. Iaccept this amendment. (Interruption).

Yesterday I used the words "I support my ownamendment". There was a fling at me. Now I used the word `Iaccept this amendment'. Because we all are one.

Even now in the Provincial Legislatures a nominatedmember of the Upper House may be appointed as Minister. Wedo not want that. We want him to be elected. This isreasonable.

The third amendment is that not less than two-thirds of the members of the Council of Ministers shall at any time bemembers of the House of the People and not more than one-third of the Council of Ministers shall at any time bemembers of the Council of States. I am not prepared to agreeto this. I do not accept it and I do not support it; Ioppose it. Supposing the majority party in the House of thePeople--we shall call it the Conservative Party, theCongress must go and the Congress will go and there will beLabour, Conservative and some other parties on economicbasis--supposing there is a Conservative party in LowerHouse which is in majority and is asked to form the Ministryand the Leader of the Party is asked to form a Ministry bythe President. This amendment says he must get one-third atleast from the Council of States. Supposing in the Upper Chamber you havenot got one-third of that party, what will happen. That willmean having people who are not of the same view. That is also objectionable.

There should be no limit to the number. Let there beMinisters from the Lower House or from the Upper House, itdoes not matter. But they must all be of one party.

The next point is that ParlI ament may appoint DeputyMinisters and ParlI amentary secretaries. That, I suppose,will be done and there is no objection to that, and Isupport that amendment.

Lastly, there is the statement that no one should beappointed if he is found guilty by a competent court ofmoral turpitude or any other offences, etc., etc., and I think that this provision is good and so I support himthere.

Sir, with these words, I resume my seat.

The Honourable Shri K. Santhanam: Mr. Vice-President,Sir, the House should be a little careful in interpretingarticles 61, 62, 63 and 64. They should not be interpretedliterally, because they embody conventions of the cabinetsystem of government evolved in Great Britain as a result ofa long struggle between the King and ParlI ament. At everystage of this

struggle the King yielded some power, but wasanxious to preserve his prestige. Therefore, at the end of the struggle, the King gave up all his power, but preservedall his forms. Therefore, it is said here that there shallbe a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at thehead to aid and advise the President in the exercise of hisfunctions. That does not mean that normally, the function of the Prime Minister is to aid or advise the President in theexercise of his functions. In fact, the position isaltogether opposite, or the reverse. It is the PrimeMinister's business with the support of the Council ofMinisters, to rule the country and the President may bepermitted now and them, to aid and advise the Council ofMinisters. Therefore, we should look at the substance andnot at the mere phraseology, which is the result ofconventions. Of course, it may be asked why we should adoptthese conventions, and why we should not put them intoprecise legal language. It might have been desirable to doso, but I do admit that it would not be easy, because thePrime Minister and the Council of Ministers are entitiesdepending upon the confidence of the House which may varyfrom day to day, and at any moment it may cease to haveconfidence in them. Therefore, to embody the position of thePrime Minister and the Council of Ministers in the Constitution may bring about a degree of rigidity which maybe inconsistent with the elasticity of the cabinet system ofgovernment. The greatest advantage of the British type isits elasticity. So long as the Prime Minister and theCouncil of Ministers have got the confidence of the House,they are absolutely sovereign and they can do anything, butthe day they lose that confidence, they become weaker andweaker and no one can say what their position will be at anyparticular moment. It is to embody this fluid position thatwe have had to adopt the words of the British convention.Therefore, there is no use interpreting them literally and then finding fault with them. Take for instance, clause (2)"The question whether any, and if so what, advice wastendered by Ministers to the President shall not be inquiredinto in any court."

Now, my friend Prof. K. T. Shah has an amendment tothis effect that there should be an exception, and that these matters can be enquired into, when there is animpeachment, by the High Court of ParlI ament. First of all,to speak of the High Court of ParlI ament is to obscure thelanguage of the Constitution, because ParlI ament issomething different, it is not a court at all. Normally noadvice is tendered by the ministers to the President at all.They simply pass orders. They come to decisions and theyexecute the decisions. Therefore, there can be no question of impeachment of a President forany advice given by the Prime Minister or the Council ofMinisters. Therefore there is no question of taking thatadvice into consideration in matters of impeachment.

Now, Sir, I wish to say one or two words regarding theamendments which have been moved. I do not think it is rightto suggest that Mr. Baig's amendment is based on anycommunal or other calculations. It is one of the recognisedsystems of government. The Swiss system, for instance,believes in an elected executive. It is something betweenthe American executive and the ParlI amentary executive.Therefore, though there is no presidential system, there isa sort of stable executive. In certain circumstances, thatsystem may be advantageous. But for a country like Indiawhich is very big and which has very wide and diverseinterests and the ParlI ament of which may consist ofviolently opposed elements, it cannot be a suitable system.It is on that ground and not on any mala-fides motives that it should be rejected.

Sir, Prof. K. T. Shah has been fighting such a lonelybattle that I hardly like to criticise him. But he has takenupon himself too much of a task and that too quiteunnecessarily. If he had concentrated on specific points, hemight have carried greater weight. As it is, he has allowedhimself to table such long amendments which I believe he hasnot

been able to scrutinise him self. Take for instanceamendment No. 1300 (2C). He says:

"No one who is not an elected member of either House ofParlI ament shall be appointed minister unless he getselected to one or the other House of ParlI ament within sixmonths of the date of his appointment."

Now, when is the minister to be appointed? When doesthe period of six months begin? Before he is appointed, hemust be elected, and before he is elected, six months maypass. So it is an obvious absurdity. Apparently, he has nothad time to look into it. When he table many amendments onmatters which should be the result of careful considerationof committees, naturally he lets himself down. Whenever weare considering a complicated constitution of this type,individual members will have to content themselves withpointing out particular points and stressing particularamendments, instead of trying to re-draft the entireconstitution. It is merely taking up the time of the Housewithout adding to its knowledge and I humbly make thesuggestion to Prof. K. T. Shah to concentrate on pointswhere it will be practicable to improve the Constitutionwithout trying to put forward an alternative constitution.

Thank you, Sir.

Mr. Vice-President: Dr. Ambedkar.

Shri Lakshminarayan Sahu (Orissa: General): Sir, thisis a very important article on which I would like to .......

Mr. Vice-President: I know there are many Members whowould like to speak on this article, but the time at thedisposal of the House is extremely limited and I also feelthat it has been sufficiently debated on.

Shri Lakshminarayan Sahu: But, Sir.......

Mr. Vice-President: Kindly do not try to over-rule thechair. Dr. Ambedkar.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Mr. Vice-President,Sir, I am sorry I cannot accept any of the amendments whichhave been tabled, either by Mr. Baig or Mr. Tahir or Prof.K. T. Shah. In reply to the points that they have made insupport of the amendments they have moved, I would like tostate my position as briefly as I can.

Mr. Mahboob Ali Baig's amendment falls into two parts.The first part of his amendment seeks to fix the number of the Cabinet Ministers. According to him they should be fifteen. The second part of hisproposition is that the Member of the Cabinet must not beappointed by the Prime Minister or the President on theadvice of the Prime Minister but should be chosen by the House by proportional representation.

Now, Sir, the first part of his amendment is obviouslyimpracticable. It is not possible at the very outset to setout a fixed number for the Cabinet. It may be that the PrimeMinister may find it possible to carry on the administrationof the country with a much less number than fifteen. Thereis no reason why the Constitution should burden him withfifteen Ministers when he does not want as many as are fixedby the Constitution. It may be that the business of theGovernment may grow so enormously big that fifteen may betoo small a number. There may be the necessity of appointingmore members than fifteen. There again it will be wrong onthe part of the Constitution to limit the number ofMinisters and to prevent him from appointing such number asthe requirements of the case may call upon to do so.

With regard to the second amendment, namely, that theMinisters should not be appointed by the President on theadvice of the Prime Minister, but should be chosen byproportional representation. I have not been able tounderstand exactly what is the underlying purpose he has inmind. So far I was able to follow his arguments, he said themethod prescribed in the Draft Constitution wasundemocratic. Well, I do not understand why it isundemocratic to permit a Prime Minister, who is chosen bythe people, to appoint Ministers from a House which is alsochosen on adult suffrage, or by people who are chosen on thebasis of adult suffrage, or by people who are chosen on thebasis of adult suffrage. I fail to understand why thatsystem is undemocratic. But I suspect that the purposeunderlying his amendment is to enable minorities to securerepresentation

in the Cabinet. Now if that is so. Isympathise with the object he has in view, because I realisethat a great deal of good administration, so to say, dependsupon the fact as to in whose hands the administration vests.If it is controlled by certain group, there is no doubtabout it that the administration will function in theinterests of the group represented by that particular bodyof people in control of administration. Therefore, there isnothing wrong in proposing that the method of choosing theCabinet should be such that it should permit members of theminority communities to be included in the Cabinet. I do notthink that aim is either unworthy or there is something init to be ashamed of. But I would like to draw the attentionof my friend, Mr. Mahboob Ali Baig, that his purpose wouldbe achieved by an addition which the Drafting Committeepropose to make of a schedule which is called Schedule 3-A.It will be seen that we have in the Draft Constitutionintroduced one schedule called Schedule 4 which contains theInstrument of Instructions to the Governor as to how he hasto exercise his discretionary powers in the matter ofadministration. We have analogous to that, decided to movean amendment in order to introduce another schedule whichalso contains a similar Instrument of Instructions to thePresident. One of the clauses in the proposed Instrument ofInstructions will be this:

"In making appointment to his Council of Ministers, thePresident shall use his best endeavours to select hisMinisters in the following manner, that is to say, toappoint a person who has been found by him to be most likelyto command a stable majority in ParlI ament as the PrimeMinister, and then to appoint on the advice of the PrimeMinister those persons, including so far as practicable,members of minority communities, who will best be inposition collectively to command the confidence ofParlI ament."

I think this Instrument of Instructions will serve thepurpose, if that is the purpose which Mr. Mahboob Ali Baighas in his mind in moving his amendment. I do not think it is possible to make any statutory provision for theinclusion of members of particular communities in theCabinet. That, I think, would not be possible, in view of the fact that our Constitution, as proposed, contains theprinciple of collective responsibility and there is no use foisting upon the Prime Minister a colleague simplybecause he happens to be the member of a particular minoritycommunity, but who does not agree with the fundamentals of the policy which the Prime Minister and his party havecommitted themselves to.

Coming to the amendment of my friend, Mr. Tahir, hewants to lay down that the President shall not be bound toaccept the advice of the Ministers where he hasdiscretionary functions to perform. It seems to that me thatMr. Tahir has merely bodily copied Section 50 of theGovernment of India Act before it was adapted. Now, theprovision contained in Section 50 of the Government of IndiaAct as it originally stood was perfectly legitimate, becauseunder that Act the Governor-General was by law and statuteinvested with certain discretionary functions, which arelaid down in Sections 11, 12, 19 and several other parts of the Constitution. Here, so far as the Governor-General isconcerned, he has no discretionary functions at all.Therefore, there is no case which can arise where thePresident would be called upon to discharge his functionswithout the advice of the Prime Minister or his cabinet.From that point of view the amendment is quite unnecessary.Mr. Tahir has failed to realise that all that the Presidentwill have under the new Constitution will be certainprerogatives but not functions and there is a vast deal ofdifference between prerogatives and functions as such.

Under a parlI amentary system of Government, there areonly two prerogatives which the King or the Head of theState may exercise. One is the appointment of the PrimeMinister and the other is the dissolution of ParlI ament.With regard to the Prime Minister it is not possible toavoid vesting the discretion in the

President. The onlyother way by which we could provide for the appointment of the Prime Minister without vesting the authority or thediscretion in the President, is to require that it is the House which shall in the first instance choose its leader,and then on the choice being made by a motion or aresolution, the President should proceed to appoint thePrime Minister.

Mr. Mohd. Tahir: On a point of order, how will itexplain the position of the Governors and the Ministers of the State where discretionary powers have been allowed to beused by the Governors?

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: The position of theGovernor is exactly the same as the position of thePresident, and I think I need not over-elaborate that at thepresent moment because we will consider the whole positionwhen we deal with the State Legislatures and the Governors.Therefore, in regard to the Prime Minister, the other thingis to allow the House to select the leader, but it seemsthat is quite unnecessary. Supposing the Prime Ministermade the choice of a wrong person either because he had notwhat is required, namely, a stable majority in the House, orbecause he was a persona non-grata with the House: theremedy lies with the House itself, because the moment thePrime Minister is appointed by the President, it would bepossible for the House or any Member of the House, or aparty which is opposed to the appointment of that particularindividual, to table a motion of no-confidence in him andget rid of him altogether if that is the wish of the House.Therefore, one way is as good as the other and it istherefore felt desirable to leave this matter in thediscretion of the President.

With regard to the dissolution of the House there again there is not any definite opinion so far as the Britishconstitutional lawyers are concerned. There is a view heldthat the President, or the King, must accept the advice of the Prime Minister for a dissolution if he finds that the House has become recalcitrant or that the House does notrepresent the wishes of the people. There is also the otherview that notwithstanding the advice of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, the President, if he thinks that the House has ceased to represent the wishes of the people,can suo moto and of his own accord dissolve the House.

I think these are purely prerogatives and they do notcome within the administration of the country and as such nosuch provision as Mr. Tahir has suggested in his amendmentis necessary to govern the exercise of the prerogatives.

Now, Sir, I come to the amendments of Prof. K. T. Shah.It is rather difficult for me to go through his longamendments and to extract what is really the summum bonum ofeach of these longish paragraphs. I have gone through themand I find that Prof. K. T. Shah wants to propose fourthings. One is that he does not want the Prime Minister, atany rate by statue. Secondly, he wants that every Ministeron his appointment as Minister should come forward and seeka vote of confidence of the Legislature. His thirdproposition is that a person who is appointed as a Minister,if he does not happen to be an elected Member of the Houseat the time of his appointment, must seek election and be aMember within six months. His fourth proposition is that noperson who has been convicted of bribery and corruption andso on and so forth shall be appointed as a Minister.

Now, Sir, I shall take each of these propositionsseparately. First, with regard to the Prime Minister, I havenot been able to understand why, for instance, Prof. K. T.Shah thinks that the Prime Minister ought to be eliminated.If I understood him correctly, he thought that he had noobjection if by convention a Prime Minister was retained aspart of the executive. Well, if that is so, if Prof. K. T.Shah has no objection for convention to create a PrimeMinister, I should have thought there was hardly anyobjection to giving statutory recognition to the position of the Prime Minister.

In England, too, as most students of constitutional lawwill remember, the Prime Minister was an office which wasrecognised

only by convention. It is only in the latterstages when the Act to regulate the salaries of the Ministerof Cabinet was enacted. I believe in 1939 or so, that astatutory recognition was given to the position of the PrimeMinister, Nonetheless, the Prime Minister existed.

I want to tell my friend Prof. K. T. Shah that hisamendment would be absolutely fatal to the other principlewhich we want to enact, namely collective responsibility.All Members of the House are very keen that the Cabinetshould work on the basis of collective responsibility andall agree that is a very sound principle. But I do not knowhow many Members of the House realise what exactly is themachinery by which collective responsibility is enforced.Obviously, there cannot be a statutory remedy. Supposing aMinister differed from other Members of the Cabinet and gaveexpression to his views which were opposed to the views of the Cabinet, it would be hardly possible for the law to comein and to prosecute him for having committed a breach ofwhat might be called collective responsibility. Obviously,there cannot be a legal sanction for collectiveresponsibility. The only sanction through which collectiveresponsibility can be enforced is through the PrimeMinister. In my judgment collective responsibility isenforced by the enforcement of two principles. One principleis that no person shall be nominated to the Cabinet excepton the advice of the Prime Minister. Secondly, no personshall be retained as a Member of the Cabinet if the PrimeMinister says that he shall be dismissed. It is only whenMembers of the Cabinet both in the matter of theirappointment as well as in the matter of their dismissal areplaced under the Prime Minister, that it would be possibleto realise our ideal of collective responsibility. I do notsee any other means or any other way of giving effect tothat principle.

Supposing you have no Prime Minister; what would reallyhappen? What would happen is this, that every Minister willbe subject to the control or influence of the President. It would be perfectly possible for the President who is no adidem with a particular Cabinet, to deal with each Ministerseparately singly, influence them and thereby causedisruption in the Cabinet. Such a thing is not impossible toimagine. Before collective responsibility was introduced in the British ParlI ament you remember how the English Kingused to disrupt the British Cabinet. He had what was calleda Party of King's Friends both in the Cabinet as well as inParlI ament. That sort of thing was put a stop to bycollective responsibility. As I said, collectiveresponsibility can be achieved only through theinstrumentality of the Prime Minister. Therefore, the PrimeMinister is really the keystone of the arch of the Cabinetand unless and until we create that office and endow thatoffice with statutory authority to nominate and dismissMinisters there can be no collective responsibility.

Now, Sir, with regard to the second proposition of myfriend Prof. K. T. Shah that a Minister on appointmentshould seek a vote of confidence. I am sure that Prof. K. T.Shah will realise that there is no necessity for any suchprovision at all. It is true that in the early history of the British Cabinet every person who, notwithstanding thefact that he was a Member of ParlI ament, if he was appointeda Minister, was required to resign his seat in ParlI amentand to seek re-election because it was felt that a person ifhe is appointed a Minister will likely to be under theinfluence of the Crown and do things in a manner notjustified by public interest. The British themselves havenow given up that system; by a statute they abrogated thatrule and no person or Member of ParlI ament who is appointeda Minister is now required to seek re-election. Thatprovision, therefore, is quite unnecessary. As I explained alittle while ago, if the Prime Minister does happen toappoint a Minister who is not worthy of the post, it wouldbe perfectly possible for the Legislature to table a motionof no-confidence either in that particular Minister or in the whole

Ministry and thereby get rid of the Prime Ministeror of the Minister or of the Minister if the Prime Ministeris not prepared to dismiss him on the call of the legislature. Therefore, my submission is that the secondproposition of Prof. K. T. Shah is also unnecessary.

With regard to his third proposition, viz., that if aperson who is appointed a member of the Cabinet is not amember of the Legislature, he must become a member of the legislature within six months, I may point out that this hasbeen provided for in article 62 (5). This amendment istherefore unnecessary.

His last proposition is that no person who is convictedmay be appointed a Minister of the State. Well, so far ashis intention is concerned, it is no doubt very laudable andI do not think any Member of this House would like to differfrom him on that proposition. But the whole question is thiswhether we should introduce all these qualifications anddisqualifications in the Constitution itself. Is it notdesirable, is it not sufficient that we should trust thePrime Minister, the Legislature and the public at largewatching the actions of the Ministers and the actions of the legislature to see that no such infamous thing is done byeither of them? I think this is a case which may eminentlybe left to the good-sense of the Prime Minister and to thegood sense of the Legislature with the general publicholding a watching brief upon them. I therefore say that these amendments are unnecessary.

Shri H. V. Kamath: I am afraid Dr. Ambedkar has lostsight of amendment No. 47 in List IV of the Fifth Week.

Mr. Vice-President: He is not bound to reply toeverything. The reply to that amendment has been given byMr. Tajamul Husain.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: That does notrequire any reply. All that has to be left to the PrimeMinister.

Mr. Vice-President: I will now put the amendments, oneby one, to vote.

The question is:

"That for the existing clause (1) of article 61, thefollowing be substituted:

`1(a) There shall be a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions,

(b) The Council shall consist of fifteen ministers selected by the elected members of both the House of ParlI ament from among themselves in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote, and one of the ministers, shall be elected as Prime Minister in like manner.'"

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: The question is:

"That in clause (1) of article 61, the words `with thePrime Minister at the head' be deleted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: The question is:

"That at the end of clause (1) of article 61 thefollowing be inserted:

`Except in so far as he is by or under the Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion.'"

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 1298 of Mr. Mohd.Tahir is blocked by the rejection of amendment No. 1297, I am not therefore putting it to vote.

I shall now put to the vote of the House amendment No.1299 of Prof. K. T. Shah. The question is:

"That at the end of clause (2) of article 61, the words`except by the High Court of ParlI ament when trying aPresident under section 50' be inserted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: I will now put amendment No. 1300of Prof. Shah as amended by amendment No. 47 of List IV of the Fifth Week to vote.

The question is:

"That after clause (2) of article 61, the following newclauses be inserted:

`(2A) On every change in the Council of Ministers, and particularly on every change of the holder of Prime-Ministership, the Prime Minister (alternatively, the President) shall present the new minister as the case may be to the People's House of ParlI ament, and shall ask for a vote of confidence from that body in the particular minister newly appointed. In the event of an adverse vote in the case of a particular minister, the minister concerned shall forthwith cease to hold office and a new minister, the

minister concerned shall forthwith cease to hold office and a new minister appointed. If a vote of confidence in the Council of Ministers collectively is refused, the Council as a whole shall resign and a new Ministry formed in its place.

(2B) Every minister shall, at the time of his appointment, be either an elected member of one or the other House of ParlI ament or shall seek election and he elected member of one or the other House within not more than six months from the date of this appointment, provided that no one elected at the time of a General Election, and appointed minister within less than six months of the date of the General Election, shall be liable to seek election.

(2C) No one who is not an elected member of either House of ParlI ament shall be appointed minister unless he get elected to one or the other House of ParlI ament within six months of the date of his appointment.

(2D) Not less than two-thirds of the members of the Council of Ministers shall at any time be members of the People's House of ParlI ament; and not more than one-third of the members of the Council of Ministers shall at any time be members of the Council of States. Members of the Council of Ministers way have such assistance in the shape of Deputy Ministers of ParlI amentary Secretaries as ParlI ament may by law from time to time determine, provided that no one shall be appointed Deputy Minister or ParlI amentary Secretary who at the time of his appointment was not an elected member of either House of ParlI ament, or who is not elected within six months of the date of this appointment to a seat in one or the other House of ParlI ament.

(2E) No one shall be appointed Minister or Deputy Minister or ParlI amentary Secretary, who has been convicted treason, or of any offence against the sovereignty, security, or integrity of the State, or of any offence involving moral turpitude and of bribery and corruption and liable to a maximum punishment of two years' rigorous punishment.

`Every minister shall, before entering upon the functions of his office, declare all his right, interest or title in or to any property, business, industry, trade of profession, and shall divest himself of the same either by selling all or any such right, interest, or title in or to any property, business, industry, trade or profession is open market or to Government at the market price; and further, shall take an oath ever to consider exclusively the interests of the country and not seek to promote his own interest or aggrandizement of his family in any act he may do or appointment he may have to make.'"

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 46 of List IV isblocked. Mr. Kamath will understand why I am not putting itto vote. It is blocked by the rejection of amendment No.1300 as amended.

Now I will put article 61 to the vote of the House.

The question is:

"That article 61 stand part of the Constitution."

The motion was adopted.

Article 61 was added to the Constitution.

Article 62

Mr. Vice-President: The House will take up forconsideration article 62. The motion is:

"That article 62 form part of the Constitution."

Mr. Mahboob Ali Baig may move amendment No. 1302. No, Isee that it is blocked by the decision in regard to theprevious article.

Mahboob Ali Baig Sahib Bahadur: Yes, Sir. That is so.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 1303 standing in thename of Kazi Syed Karimuddin may now be moved.

I should tell the Mover that parts (1) and (2) areblocked. He may move part (3) only.

Shri T. T. Krishnamachari: May I point out that ifparts (1) and (2) of this amendment are blocked as result of the rejection of a previous amendment, the rest of theamendment cannot be moved?

Mr. Vice-President: Part (3) of the amendment may bemoved. It deals with the removal of a Member of the Cabinet.

Kazi Syed Karimuddin: Sir, in view of the ruling givenby you that sub-clauses (1) and (2) of my amendment arebarred, it has really become difficult for me to make aspeech on parts (3) and (3A).

The

Honourable Shri K. Santhanam: Is it not barred bythe rejection of an earlier amendment? Unless the Ministersare elected, this will not follow at all. The thing ismeaningless as it is.

Kazi Syed Karimuddin: It is not meaningless.

Mr. Vice-President: Kindly let Mr. Santhanam speak.

The Honourable Shri K. Sanathanam: Part (3) isconsequential upon part (2). Only if (2) is accepted, part(3) can be considered. It will have no meaning otherwise. it is only if Ministers are to be elected this will arise. Herethe Ministers are merely appointed by the President. Thenthe amendment will make them irremovable. His point is thatif they are elected they should not be removed.

Kazi Syed Karimuddin: My amendment is regarding theremoval of Ministers.

Shri T. T. Krishnamachari: May I point out, Sir, thatif sub-clause (2) of article 62 remains and is not beingomitted, part (3) of amendment No, 1303 cannot be moved.Sub-clause (2) of article 62 says: "Ministers shall holdoffice..........., etc." If that remains, part (3) of thehonourable Member's amendment, cannot have any place in it.

Mr. Vice-President: Mr. Karimuddin wants a specialprovision for the removal of Members of the Cabinet. Is thatnot so?

Kazi Syed Karimuddin: Yes.

Mr. Vice-President: Mr. Krishnamachari's contention isthat this is barred. Why?

Shri T. T. Krishnamachari: If the Honourable Memberwants to achieve his object, sub-clause (2) has to beomitted first. If parts (1) and (2) of his amendment are notmoved, the third part would not fit in at all.

Kazi Syed Karimuddin: Parts (1) and (2) have nothing todo with part (3) of my amendment.

Mr. Vice-President: This may be interpreted as asubstitute for (2) and (3). At any rate I allow him to makehis point.

Kazi Syed Karimuddin: Mr. Vice-President, Sir, I moveamendment for the inclusion of sub-clause of (3) and (3A):

"(3) A member of the Cabinet shall not be liable to beremoved except on impeachment by the House on the ground ofcorruption or treason or contravention of laws of thecountry or deliberate adoption of policy detrimental to theinterests of the State.

(3A) The procedure for such impeachment will be thesame as provided in article 50."

Sir, my submission is that at present the executivemachinery of the government in the country is deterioratingvery fast because the legislators and all those who belongto the majority parties in the assemblies exercise verygreat influence on the Ministers. If the Ministers do notlisten to the legislators and their supporters, the resultis that they are likely to be removed. Under thesecircumstances it is clear that even the Congress HighCommand have felt that a procedure should be evolved bywhich the Ministers should not be compelled to accede to therequests of the legislators and their supporters. In C.P.the Honourable Pandit Misra has issued clear instructionsthat government servants should not allow any interferenceby Congressmen and their supporters. This means that in thiscountry executive is being influenced by those who aresupporters of the party. Until the Ministers feel secure in their seats, it is possible that there will be interferencein the day to day administration of the country. Thereforemy submission is that, in order to have a stable and aformidable government, which would not be influenced by thepeople in the street or by their supporters, it is verynecessary that it should not be removable by the House. I have laid down in (3) "except on impeachment on the groundof corruption or treason or contravention of the laws of the country or deliberate adoption of policy detrimentalto the interests of the State," they shall not be removed.

Shri Mahavir Tyagi: What about a no-confidence motion?Can it be moved or not?

Kazi Syed Karimuddin: No.

(Amendments Nos. 1304, 1305, 1306, 1307 and 1308 were not moved.)

Prof. K. T. Shah: Mr. Vice-President, Sir, I beg tomove:

"That in clause (1) of article 62, before the words`and the other ministers' the words `from the members of theparty commanding a majority of votes in the People's

Houseof ParlI ament' be inserted."

The amended clause would read:

"The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the Presidentfrom among the Party commanding a majority of votes in thePeoples' House of ParlI ament, and the other Ministers etc."

Sir, this is just to clarify the idea that the Ministryis not only collectively responsible to the legislature, butalso that it is homogeneously selected and that therefore it is guaranteed the confidence of the House. That is, I think,necessary to clarify in the Constitution itself in order tosecure that the Ministry is not only stable, but iscommanding the confidence of the House. Those who accept theprinciple of collective responsibility of the Ministry to the chosen representatives of the people, should not findany fault with this suggestion as it is only clarifying whatis no doubt the intention of the whole clause, and in factof the whole Constitution.

I realise that I making myself somewhat unpopular withthose who do not like the number or nature of the amendmentsthat I have put forward, or are unable to follow in themultiplicity of the clauses that I have suggested theessence of those clauses. I very much regret that I cannothelp doing so, because I do not judge that my function ismerely to get anything accepted by those who will notaccept. None so blind as will not see, nor none so deaf aswill not hear. My function, Sir, is not to get thoseamendments successfully through. My function is, I hold, toplace my view on each point before the House; and it is for the House as a whole to accept or reject after hearing myarguments. Prophets are never honoured in their own time. Ido not look upon the task that I have assigned to myself asmerely to get my views successfully adopted. I am deeplygrateful to my friend Mr. Santhanam, who was pleased tocommiserate with me on that heavy burden I have placed onmyself which he considers unnecessary. But, I repeat, Sir, Ido not view my work here merely in the light of thesuccessful acceptance of the proposals that I have beenputting forward in the House. I have, under the procedure ofthis House to propose, not an alternative Constitution, butonly amendments to each particular clause as it comes up.Accordingly, without going out of the rules, it would beimpossible for me to convey to the House the ideas that I have before me. It may be very well for those who once stoodfor the separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, to change places, to thinkdifferently about it now that they may have changed theirchair. I have no objection to that. But, for my part, I havenever believed in the doctrine that consistency is not avirtue in politics. Consistency may not be a virtue amongpoliticians. Unfortunately, not being able to accept thatdoctrine, I continue to present my ideas to the Houseregardless altogether of the fate with which the House mightaccept them. Every time I have attempted to put forwardparticular principles, the House is unwilling to see eye to eye with me; but I assure you that unless I am barredaltogether by a specific motion of the House that allamendments tabled by me shall be rejected even before theyare moved. I will present every one of my amendments, speakon them, and abide by whatever fate they may have in the House.

Mr. Vice-President: The House stands adjourned till 10A.M. tomorrow.

The Constituent Assembly then adjourned till Ten of theClock on Friday, the 31st December 1948.