CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA - Volume VIII


Friday, the 10th June 1949

The Constituent Assembly of India met in the Constitution Hall, New Delhi, at Eight of the Clock, Mr President (The Honourable Dr. Rajendra Prasad) in the Chair.

HINDI NUMERALS ON CAR NUMBER PLATES

Seth Govind Das (C.P. & Berar: General): *[Mr. President, before you proceed to take up the business of the House fixed for today; I would like to draw your attention to a news item appearing in the Hindustan Times dated 9th instant which relates to the explanation submitted by the Delhi Police to the Home Department regarding the question submitted by the Delhi Police to the Home Department regarding the question of number plates on motor cars which had been raised by me here. It is stated therein that:

"It is understood that the attention of the Home Ministry has been drawn to the Indian Motor Vehicles Act of 1949, according to which the number plates must bear the number of the vehicle in English letters and numerals. The letter further points out that the Indian Motor Vehicles Act applies to the whole country and the Delhi administration have no power to amend it."

I would like to say that the same law is followed in United Provinces as well as in the province of Central Provinces to which I belong. In spite of that the number plates on cars, even those, which belong to Ministers, are in Hindi. Sir, you are aware of this fact too that according to the rules of the Parliament speeches may be delivered there in English, but the Speaker of our Parliament Shri Mavalankar has declared it again and again that under the changed circumstances of today there can be no justification for enforcing this rule. Speeches are continually being made in the Parliament in Hindi. I would like to submit it to you that the argument advanced by the Delhi Police administration is devoid of commonsense and is in contradiction to the existing circumstances. It is a most absurd argument. I request you to kindly do something in this matter so that an untoward situation may nor arise.]

Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi (Madras: General): Sir, ordinary there must be some motion on which we being speaking and I want to know now Seth Govind Das is in order in springing on us something which is not before the House. If there is any grievance, it is much better he goes and meets the Honourable the President and not mention all these matters here. There must be a motion for any Member to speak on; and what is the motion, may I know, on which he is speaking? Is there any motion before the House, Sir?

Mr. President: There is no motion before the House. The honourable Member the other day drew my attention to the fact that one honourable Member had been interfered with because the number plate of his car was in Hindi. As I said, I would look into the matter. The honourable Member has drawn my attention to something which has appeared in the Hindustan Times relating to the same matter. That is what he was reading out.

Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi: Sir, the usual practice is for him to contact you in your chamber and I think he should not bring all these matters before the House. It may not be a good precedent, Sir.

Pandit Balkrishna Sharma (United Province: General): It is a question of the privilege of the Members.

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*[] Translation of Hindustani speech.

Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi: I do not minimise the importance of the subject.

Pandit Balkrishna Sharma: I want to submit for your kind consideration that my honourable Friend seems to be a little ticklish about the whole thing for the simple reason that it concerns the privilege of the Members and he seems to attach little importance to it. An honourable Member has every right to bring the matter before the House with or without notice. The point of order raised by my honourable Friend is that there was no motion. There have been so many instance and I myself was in such a position and you were kind enough to permit me to raise the

question regarding the coins that are in contemplation to be issued, and naturally, we being the Parliament, we have got to raise the subject here even though there may not be any notice.

Mr. President: I have looked into the matter because it was raised the other day and I would not give a ruling about the question of privilege and I would refer the matter to the Government.

Pandit Balkrishna Sharma: I am also one of those who have suffered at the hands of the Delhi Administration in this respect. My car was chalaned from the 1st of April and I did not rush to the Press. I wrote to the Deputy Commissioner, and if I am not betraying a confidence-I hope I am not-I had the pleasure of meeting the Deputy Commissioner in the At Home which the Honourable the Prime Minister gave the other day and brought to his notice the matter of the number plates being in Hindi language and the Deputy Commissioner said that the Motor Vehicles Act contains a clause under which all the cars should bear the number plates in English characters. He further said that in view of the Act as it stands today, he cannot instruct the Delhi 'Administration otherwise and that the Delhi Administration takes notice of such of the cars as do not bear number plates in English characters. My submission to him has always been that Delhi as a Province as surrounded on all sides by provinces which have declared Hindi as their Government language and Devanagari as the Government script.

Mr. President: Order, order. I have got the information which you wanted to give me. As I said, honourable Members will not insist upon my giving a ruling on the question of privilege. It may not be in their interest. As I have said, the matter will be taken up with the Government.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: (Bombay: General): There is no privilege to break the law.

FLYING OF UNION JACK OVER COUNCIL HOUSE

Shri B. Das (Orissa: General): Sir, I wish to draw your attention to the fact that Union Jacks were flying aloft in this Council House building yesterday, though not, over this august sovereign Chamber. I wish you will order that as long as the Constituent Assembly sits in this place no Union Jack is to be unfurled in this Council building.

Mr. President: The honourable Member may not like it, but there is no help, at any rate, at present.

Maulana Hasrat Mohani (United Provinces: Muslim): May I bring to your notice as well as to this Assembly a very serious matter? The Indian Government is taking a sort of police action inside the Sikkim State; it has not accepted to the Indian Union and the Government appear now to be compelling them to accede.

Mr. President: Order, order. I am afraid I cannot take notice of such things. These are not matters for the Constituent Assembly, but for the Legislative Assembly when it sits.

Honourable Members: Hear, Hear.

DRAFT CONSTITUTION (contd.)

*Article 92-(contd.)

Mr. President: We shall proceed with article 92.

Prof K. T. Shah (Bihar: General): Sir, I beg to move:

"That at the end of clause (1), the following be added:-

'Provided that once the annual financial statement has been laid before Parliament, and Parliament has become seized of the statement, it shall not be competent for the President, or any Minister acting in his name, or any other person, to alter or modify any item in any particular, or withdraw the entire statement; and that the House of the People shall alone be competent to alter or amend or modify, accept or reject, in part or wholly, the financial statement thus placed before it; provided further that only the People's House or Parliament shall be competent to make any modifications, addition or alternation in the financial statement or to accept or reject it, in part or in toto.'"

This, Sir, is intended to establish the principle of the supremacy of the House of the People in matters financial. Once the financial statement has been prepared and presented to Parliament, Parliament should be the sole authority for disposing of it; and no other person or authority can do

so except, of course, by a vote of the House of the People.

By this amendment, I desire that the supremacy of Parliament, and in that the House of the People, in matters relating to Public Finance should be made absolutely clear beyond doubt. Hence the provision should be made that once the financial statement has been placed before the House, and the House has become seized of the matter, neither the President nor any Minister acting under his authority or in his name, would be competent to alter, or modify, or even withdraw any item in the statement in any way. If any change has to be made, that change can be made only by the House of the People by a definite vote of that body; and not by even Parliament in both Chambers.

This matter is so self-evident in any parliamentary democracy which wants that the Lower House should be the sole custodian, watch-dog of matters financial, that it seems to me that this proposition should be unchallengeable. It is in no way departing from the spirit or accepted convention of the model Constitution which we have been following in this Draft, I mean the British practice. There it is very clear by convention, because there is no written constitution in Britain, that the House of Commons is the sole supreme authority in matters of Public Finance. Those of us who follow that model, and provide a written Constitution, would be doing nothing more than giving effect to a well-known convention whereby the Parliament or the House of the People alone would be competent to make any alternations in such financial provisions, whether they relate to expenditure or revenue, or whether they relate to otherwise disposing of or altering the financial provisions for a given year. Only the vote of the House of the People should be supreme and final in these matters and no other authority should have a say in it. Once the Financial Statement is placed before the House of the People, no other authority should have or can have anything to do with it. I therefore commend this to the House.

May I move the next amendment also, Sir?

Mr. President: Yes.

Prof. K. T. Shah: Sir, the next amendment is:

"That after clause (1) of article 92, the following new clause be added:-

'(1a) At the time the annual financial statement is presented to the People's House of Parliament, the President may invite the members of the Council of State to be present in the People's House of Parliament.'"

Sir, this is practice which follows as a corollary from the principle I have just suggested: that the House of the People alone is competent to deal with,

and has unchallenged supreme authority in regard to matters financial. The other House, whatever its powers and authority may be in regard to other legislation, should, in matter financial, be kept out altogether.

To give effect to this, not only would I suggest that the financial statement can be laid only before the House of the People, I would go further and say that, if any information is to be conveyed to the other House in this regard, it may be conveyed by inviting the other House to be present on the occasion of the presentation of the Budget. The formal presentment and dealing with the budget or financial statement should be and must be only by the House of the People.

This amendment is only making clear the general principle which I have been enunciating all this while, that the Council of State should have no say in matters financial.

I commend these amendments to the House.

(Amendments Nos. 1699 and 1700 were not moved.)

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Sir, I move:

"That in sub-clause (b) of clause (3) of article 92, the following new sub-clause be added:-

'(bb) the salaries and allowances of Ministers and Members of Parliament.'"

Sir, I do not wish to speak on this amendment at all. I would only like to know, when the emoluments of the President, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Council of States, the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of the People have been regarded as expenditure charged to the revenues

of India, why the salaries and allowances of the Ministers and members of Parliament should not be so treated.

Mr. President: The salaries of the Ministers come for the vote of the House because the Ministers are responsible.

Shri H. V. Kamath: The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Council of State, the Speaker and Deputy Speaker.....

Mr. President: They are not responsible in the sense in which the Ministers are.

Shri H. V. Kamath: There is one difficulty, Sir. No article in this Constitution says that the salaries and allowances of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Council of States and the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of the People shall not be reduced during their term of office. But, there is such a provision with regard to the salaries and allowances of the President. So it appears that Parliament may alter the former.

Mr. President: I am afraid your amendment cuts across the whole principle of responsible Ministers.

Shri H. V. Kamath: Sir, I formally move the amendment.

(Amendments Nos. 1703, 1704 and 1705 were not moved.)

Prof. K. T. Shah: Mr. President, Sir, I beg to move:

"That is sub-clause (f) of clause (3) of article 92, the words 'on by Parliament by law' be deleted."

The amended proposition would then read:

"any other expenditure declared by this Constitution to be so charged."

Here I think is a matter of very basic importance in regard to the financial administration of the country, and its public economy at large. Under this article a number of items are specifically laid down by this Constitution as charged on the revenues of India,-now as being in the Consolidated Fund, and as such not likely to be voted upon in every year. The various items do not, in my opinion, all stand on a par. It the intention is to keep some of these items out of the vicissitudes of party politics, if the intention is to keep them fixed and unchangeable at least for some given period, such as for instance the salary and allowance of the President during the term of his office, or the salary and allowance of the presiding authorities in the two Chambers of the Legislature, or the salaries, pensions and allowances of the Supreme Court Judges, then it is but right that we should keep these items as limited or as few in number and as small in volume as we possibly can.

There should be in my opinion no room left for increasing the amounts, and widening the nature of the items that can be so kept out of the annual vote of the House. There are items actually mentioned here, which appear to me to be utterly unnecessary, and even unwise, to be so included in the charged list or the Consolidated Fund. Take for instance item (c) which relates to debt charge for which the Government of India is liable. That includes interest and sinking fund charges, redemption charges, other expenditure relating to the raising of loans, and the service of the debt, i.e. paying interest, registering transfers etc. Now here is an item the justice of which being included in the items charged on the revenues of India, or those put in the Consolidated Fund, may be open to question. I quite realise that, in the interest of the national credit and its stability, it is but proper that the ordinary debt charges may be not open to annual vote. At the same time is must be known to every student of Public Finance that frequently countries obliged again and again, the most highly credit-worthy countries have had recourse to altering or reducing the rate of interest on their permanent debt. All Conversion schemes that have been adopted in the past, and are being applied even today have changed the rate or interest and varied the contract unilaterally. If those items are left outside the voting power, then I am afraid the possibility of effecting economies and of adjusting our obligations to our resources from time to time might be very substantially curtailed.

I have, however, in view of the transition through which we are going, in view also of domestic as well as foreign complications that may arise in

connection with this question of using our national credit and borrowing abroad, not given notice of any amendment regard to that particular item, though I confess that I feel very reluctant to see it included in this article.

Even if the interest and sinking fund charges are kept outside the annual vote, I do not see why the incidental charges, like brokerage or the management charges paid to Reserve Bank on the administration of the debt service should be included in this manner. I think it is really inappropriate to do so. But for the reason I just mentioned-that somewhat delicate financial situation of the present moment-I would have ventured to offer an amendment even on these matters.

But when you come to such a promiscuous on an omnibus provision as is included in sub-clause (f) which permit Parliament hereafter to add any other item of expenditure as being in the non-votable list, then I am afraid the Constitution leaves the door very wide open to the withdrawal of the powers-to the curtailment of the financial authority of the Lower House, which I think is highly inexpedient and unacceptable. If you trust to our people, and believe that the future Parliament is for all these purposes sovereign, it would be unnecessary for us to lay down in this article here, in the manner in which it has been done, the power of Parliament to make any alternation in the items that cannot be voted upon every year. You give no power to increase the votable list; why then do you give power to increase the non-votable list?

On the other hand, if you mean this Constitution to be a king of restrictive instrument, if you design this Constitution to lay down specifically those items which and which alone can be excluded from the vote of the Parliament, as my amendment provides, then I suggest that the best course is to keep them as few in number, and as small in amount as possible. But by an omnibus provision of this kind that you are making, you proposes to make parliamentary authority function ineffectively and restrictively in matter financial. For, once an expenditure is withdrawn from the annual vote, any amount of abuse may occur. Parliament, at least in a given year or until the Constitution is revised, may not be able to alter.

I suggest, therefore, that here is a matter of very grave consequence to which attention should be paid by those responsible for this Constitution. The amendment I have attempted to bring in does not affect any necessary safeguard for maintaining public credit. The article gives power to include in the Consolidated Fund or as charges upon the revenue, certain items necessary and proper to be kept outside the annual vote. It only prevents the future Parliament legislating, and thereby withdrawing, so to say, from the competence of its own successors, the right of voting upon certain other items in the financial statement. Remember it would be curtailing the power of a sovereign body, its successor, which no Parliament should really have as against its own successor by such device as this clause contains. It would only open the door to frequent alternations, and to party influences or other transitory factors of that kind, which is, -to say the least-most undesirable. I therefore commend this amendment to the House.

Mr. President: Dr. Ambedkar. No. 7 of the First List.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Sir, I beg to move:

"That in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (2) of article 92, for the words 'revenues of India' the word 'Consolidated Fund of India' be substituted."

"That in clause (3) of article 92, for the words 'revenues of India' the words 'Consolidated Fund of India' be substituted."

"That after sub-clause (d) of clause (3) of article 92, the following sub-clause be inserted:-

'(dd) the salary, allowances and pension payable to or in respect of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India.'"

With regard to 9, all I need say is that the House has already passed article 124, clause (5) which contains the present amendment. It is therefore here because it was felt that

all items which are declared to be charges on the Consolidated Fund of India had better be brought in together, rather than be scattered in different parts of the Constitution.

Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena (United Provinces: General): Sir, my honourable Friend Mr. Kamath has moved an interesting amendment which says that the words "salaries and allowances of Ministers and Members of Parliament" should be added to the sub-clause so that they will be a charge on the revenues of India. It means that they will not be votable with the result that the executive will become a irremovable one. I am rather perplexed at this. The charges which will be charged on the revenues of India are the salaries of the President, the Speaker, the Judges of the Supreme Court and now the Auditor-General. They will become non-votable under article 93. I do not know whether the sovereign parliament of the nation should be denied the opportunity to vote upon the salaries of even these high dignitaries. Probably Mr. Kamath wants to reduce the provisions of this article to an absurdity : otherwise there is no meaning in his amendment. I agree that we are bringing in a dangerous thing in the Constitution by these provisions. I wholeheartedly support the amendment of Prof. Shah for deleting the last clause, which says that parliament can declare any expenditure to be non-votable. This, I think, is unprecedented in any constitution of the world and I would like Dr. Ambedkar to enlighten us how sub-clause (f) of article 93 is in consonance with democratic procedure. I feel that the sovereign parliament of the nation should have the right vote on every item of expenditure. I can see some argument for making the salaries of the Judges of the Supreme Court, the Auditor-General and the Speaker to be charged to the revenues of the State. It is possible that a party in power by a majority might vote down the salaries of the judges of the Supreme Court so that the judges will try to humour the party in power and that will detract from their independence. But this is far-fetched and no party dare vote down salaries of Supreme Court Judges, etc. That the salaries of the other people should also be permitted to become non-votable is not fair. Clause (f) must go.

Mr. President: I shall put the amendment of Prof. Shah (1693) each item separately to the House.

The question is:

"That in clause (1) of article 92, after the word 'President' the following be added :-'or the Finance Minister acting under the authority of the President, specifically given for the purpose.'"

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is :

"That in clause (1) of article 92 for the words 'both the Houses' the words 'the People's House' be substituted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That in clause (1) of article 92 for the words 'estimated receipts' the following be inserted :-

'on revenue account as well as from borrowed moneys, or transfer of sums from other accounts to Revenue Account.'"

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That in clause (1) of article 92, after the word 'expenditure' the words 'whether charged upon the revenues of India or on other account' be added."

The amendment was negatived.

The President: The question is:

"That at the end of clause (1) the following proviso be added :-

,Provided that once the annual financial statement has been laid before Parliament, and Parliament has become seized of the statement, it shall not be competent for the President, or any Minister acting in this name, or any other person, to alter or modify any item in any particular, or withdraw the entire statement; and that the House of the People shall alone be competent to alter or amend or modify, accept or reject, in part or wholly, the financial statement thus placed before; provided further that only the People's House or Parliament shall be competent to make any modifications, addition or alteration in the financial statement or to accept or reject it, in part or in

toto.'"

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That after clause (1) of article 92, the following new clause be added :-

'(1a) At the time the annual financial statement is presented to the People's House of Parliament, the President may invite the members of the Council of States to be present in the People's House of Parliament.'"

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is :

"That in sub-clause (b) of clause (3) of article 92, for the words 'emoluments' the word 'salaries' be substituted."

The amendment was adopted.

Shri H. V. Kamath: Sir, may I ask for leave of the House to withdraw my amendment No. 1702?

The amendment was, by leave of the Assembly, withdrawn.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That in sub-clauses (f) of clause (3) of article 92, the words 'or by Parliament by law' be deleted.

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (2) of article 92, for the words 'revenues of India' the words 'Consolidated Fund of India' be substituted."

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That in clause (3) of article 92, for the words 'revenues of India' the words 'Consolidated Fund of India' be substituted."

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That after sub-clause (d) of clause (3) of article 92, the following sub-clause be inserted :-

'(dd) the salary, allowances and pension payable to or in respect of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India.'"

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:

Article 92, as amended, stand part of the Constitution.

The motion was adopted.

Article 92, as amended, was added to the Constitution.

*Article 93 (Amendment No. 1707 was not moved.)

Prof. K. T. Shah: Sir, I move:

"That in clause (1) of article 93, after the word 'Parliament' the words 'unless Parliament has by law previously passed in any year for that purpose enacted that any expenditure under article 92(3) shall be deemed not to be charged on the revenues of India' be added."

Here again I attempt to bring out the governing principle of the supremacy of Parliament, and particularly the House of the people, in matters financial. While the entire system of grouping of public expenditure is considerable chunks in the Consolidated Fund, and making it outside the vote of Parliament is in itself, at least to me, objectionable, as reducing the extent of parliamentary control over expenditure, even granting that these amounts necessary to be in the Consolidated Fund, as under the peculiar circumstances of today such practice may be necessary, I would not like Parliament to be utterly deprived of any right under the Constitution to withdraw from these non-votable items anything that it by law desires should not be so included.

I would therefore, like power to be left to Parliament hereafter to legislate-such legislation must be in the previous year-and say that, in the subsequent year, a given item shall not be deemed to be charged upon the revenues of India, or to be in the Consolidated Fund from that time onwards, so that it would be open to the vote of the House. What under the peculiar circumstances of India may be included in the Consolidated Fund, should be open to Parliament to withdraw from that Fund by a law.

This practice of distinguishing between votable and non-votable items, or those open to the annual vote of Parliament and those withdrawn from that vote, but permitted to be discussed, is a legacy of the preceding regime, which, I think, was open, and is today still more open, to strong objection. For that regime, no doubt, it can be understood that there were many items of expenditure which it did not care, would not dare, to bring before the representatives of the Indian people. For instance, its huge defence expenditure, or its Home charges, and so on, if open to Parliamentary vote, would never allow the Budget to be passed. But that cannot be an excuse which the authorities

of today could hold out for following the same practice. The present Parliament, or the Parliament under this Constitution, would be the supreme financial authority. It would be a sovereign legislative body which ipso facto, should have the right to discuss every item of expenditure and also to vote upon it. In this case, the present article provides that discussion may be allowed; but that on certain items described in the preceding article, which are said to be charged upon the revenues, or are in the Consolidated Fund, there shall be no voting.

In my opinion this is adding insult to injury. You say to the Legislature: "you are entitled to discuss, but you have no right to vote upon such items". What is the use of a discussion of this futile character, which is self-frustrating, and which, if anything, can only result in irresponsible, destructive negative criticism which our leaders seem so utterly to dislike?

I, therefore, do not see any justification for this article, except in the plea, commonly urged now-a-days, of extraordinary circumstances, or the delicate position today of our credit and finance. Hence, even if you may be persuaded to accept what in my opinion is fundamentally objectionable, for special extra-ordinary reasons of today, I think for the future of any rate room must be left for Parliament to legislate,-and by legislation-that is to say, after a solemn discussion of the principle as well as the provision of that particular law-that any item be withdrawn from the charged list, or the non-votable list, and made open for the vote of the House.

It may quite possibly be, that for instance, in the item of public debt, which is charged upon the revenue, or in the charge of the service of that debt which also may amount to a considerable figure, there may be room hereafter for Parliament to demand scrutiny and voting instead of being merely content with discussion of it. In a case like this, while I am not suggesting that the basic Constitution should be varied by Parliament, the national Legislature should, under the Constitution, have the right to make its own law in any previous year, and say that in a subsequent year, it would be entitled to discuss as well as vote upon specified items previously in the charged or non-voted list.

In asking this, therefore, I am not making any really fundamental variation from the scheme of this article. I only suggesting that the power of parliament should not for ever be mortgaged to the executive, as this Constitution tends to do; and that it should be left open to it by legislation to withdraw any item, now charged upon the revenues, from such charged list, and make it open to the vote of the House. I commend the proposal to the House.

(Amendments Nos. 1709 and 1710 were not moved.)

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move:

"That in clause (1) of article 93, for the words 'revenues of India' the words 'Consolidated Fund of India' be substituted."

Mr. President: The question is:

"That in clause (1) of article 93, after the word 'Parliament' the words 'unless Parliament has by law previously passed in any year for that purpose enacted that any expenditure under article 92(3) shall be deemed not to be charged on the revenues of India' be added."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That in clause (1) of article 93, for the words ' revenues of India' the words 'Consolidated Fund of India' be substituted."

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That article 93, as amended, stand part of the Constitution."

The motion was adopted.

Article 93, as amended, was added to the Constitution

*Article 94

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move:

"That for article 94, the following article be substituted :-

'94. Appropriation Bills (1) As soon as may be after the grants under the last preceding article have been made by the House of the People there shall be introduced a bill to provide for the appropriation out of the Consolidated Fund of India all moneys

required to meet-

(a) The grants so made by the House of the people; and

(b) the expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India but not exceeding in any case the amount shown in the statement previously laid before Parliament.

(2) No amendment shall be proposed to any such Bill in either 'House of Parliament which will have the effect of varying the amount or altering the destination of any grant so made or of varying the amount of any expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, and the decision of the person presiding as to the amendments which are admissible under this clause shall be final.

(3) Subject to the provision of the next two succeeding articles no money shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund of India except under appropriation made by law passed in accordance with the provisions of this article'."

As I explained yesterday the object of this new article 94 is to replace the provisions contained in the old article relating to the certification of a Schedule by the Governor-General.

(Amendments Nos. 1711 to 1716 were not moved.)

Mr. President: Does any Member wish to say anything on the new article moved?

The Honourable Shri K. Santhanam (Madras: General): Sir, while there may be no material objection to the substitution of the original article by this new article, I cannot help feeling that this is a wholly unnecessary formality inflicted on our procedure. Dr. Ambedkar no doubt explained that we are trying to adapt our procedure to the procedure of the House of Commons, but there is one material difference which he has not touched upon. In the House of Commons, votes on estimates are taken in committee, the whole House going into committee. The votes taken there have no legal validity. Therefore they have to put in a special Appropriation Act to give legal validity to the votes taken. But our procedure is that the votes on demands for grants are taken in the full House with the Speaker in the Chair. Therefore the votes are as valid as the Appropriation Act itself. When once votes are taken in the House it is not possible for anyone to change them. Therefore I do not see why we should again have the procedure of a Bill and a vote taken. After all it is provided that you cannot make any change whatsoever in the Bill. When the House has legally done something I do not see any particular purpose in again bringing it as a Bill and providing for further speeches wasting two or three days of the time of the Legislature.

Dr. Ambedkar said that it was constitutionally objectionable to invest the president with the power of authenticate. If that is the objection, I submit that the Speaker may be asked to authenticate whatever is passed. Thus the entire formality could be avoided.

My purpose in coming to the forum is not so much to speak about it as about clause (3)-I want to draw the attention of the House to clause (3) of this article. I want them to vote on it knowing fully the implications. It says: "Subject to the provisions of the next two succeeding articles, no money shall be drawn from out of the Consolidated Fund of India except under appropriation made by law passed in accordance with the provisions of this article." Article 95 provides for supplementary or excess grants. Therefore clause (3) means that for the purpose of supplementary and excess grants money can be drawn without the vote of Parliament. Is that the purpose? I can understand expenditure being incurred by the Government at their own risk, but payment should be deferred till vote is given by Parliament. But as the clause stands payments can be made by someone or other out of the Consolidated Fund without a vote of Parliament. I think that more or less nullifies the entire effort to see that no money is paid without a vote. Therefore I suggest that clause (3) must go and necessary provision should be made in article 95. I suggest that this is essential to make the law effective.

I agree that Parliament's power over the finances should be effective. I am as emphatic as Mr. Sidhva himself that

this should be effective. But let us not pretend to be effective and nullify it by a provision which makes it ineffective. If clause (3) stands, a hundred crores of rupees can be spent as supplementary or excess grants and then the whole thing will come before Parliament for mere ratification. Therefore clause (3) of the new article must go.

Shri R. K. Sidhva (C. P. & Berar: General): Mr. President, Sir, my Friend Mr. Santhanam has suggested the deletion of clause (3) from the amendment moved by Dr. Ambedkar.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Not the whole of clause (3). I want the deletion of the words "Subject to the provisions of the next two succeeding articles". It must be article 95. I object only to the "two succeeding article". I do not object to article 96 being their in this clause (3).

Shri R. K. Sidhva: I have followed you correctly. You know very well how the House applauded article 92 for the new provisions inserted there in so as to make the question of money Bills more liable to scrutiny. My Friend Mr. Santhanam also desires it. He too wants to make it more effective. But his argument is, why do you bring in another Bill and waste the time of the House giving it the opportunity to repeat the arguments and making speeches for two or three days more? His feeling is that the time of the House will be taken by such an unnecessary procedure being followed. I do not share his views in this matter. On the contrary this provision provides for a second check upon what has been done on an earlier occasion. Therefore there is nothing wrong. Under article 92 which we have passed we want that our whole financial procedure should be effective. As that is so, this clause is absolutely necessary. As I said the other day, question of time is no consideration in matters like finance. Only a provision of this kind will enable a complete and thorough check being made upon the expenditure that will be made from time to time by the executive. If you delete this I feel that the very object on which we have concentrated our attention will be frustrated. I therefore feel that the amendment as it stands should be accepted. If you take away anything from it, it will detract from the importance we attach to it. I do not think that Mr. Santhanam has made out a case for his proposition. I am sure he would have supported this article if he were not a Minister. He now feels that the discussions on the Budget and Money Bills should be disposed of as early as possible. I have noticed that feeling of his. I ask him, however, to have consideration for the feelings of Members who have also some duties to discharge. He should not stand in the way of Members desiring to keep a check upon what is being done by the executive who are responsible to the Ministers. The actions of the Ministers can only be questioned in Parliament by the Members. Therefore this amendment which has been moved after mature consideration to satisfy the desire of the House should be adopted.

Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad (West Bengal: Muslim): Sir, I do not desire to say anything on the merits of this amendment. Experienced experts have differed from certain provisions of this amendment. I however desire to draw the attention of the House to a growing and alarming tendency to introduce new amendments to the Constitution itself.

You have already ruled that amendments to amendments may be given but new amendments of the Constitution itself should not be submitted. Amendment No. 11 on the First List totally replaces article 94; amendment No. 12 replaces article 95 and amendment No. 13 replaces article 96. These amendments are new and are amendments to the Constitution itself. I am not raising a mere technical objection, but these embody very serious changes. I have no doubt whatsoever that the way we are proceeding with the consideration of the Draft Constitution, the way we are proceeding backwards and forwards, considering one article here and then switching over to another article there, I think this is certain to lead to anomalies and inconsistencies which cannot

be detected on the spur of the moment. It is for this reason that I had suggested that we should have a final production from the Drafting Committee. The House should have a complete picture of what is really intended. Instead of this, we are showered daily with absolutely new amendments, new ideas and new thoughts. This, to say the least, is extremely difficult and inconvenient, if not utterly confusing. I submit, Sir, that the suggestion that I made a few days ago that there should be a little adjournment was made so that the Drafting Committee may have time to give us final picture of their own mind to enable us to come thoroughly prepared. Unfortunately that suggestion of mine was taken to be a dilatory move. I had nothing like that whatsoever in my mind. I have already defected serious inconsistencies in the Draft Constitution as we have accepted and I do not know how many more inconsistencies are lurking behind these innocent looking new amendments. I ask you, Sir, to consider whether it would be easy or convenient for the Members to consider these new amendments to the Constitution itself if they are sent in from they to day. I do not, I confess, possess the mental dexterity of some of the Members. I am a little slow to understand these things and therefore desire that things should proceed in such a way that the slowest Member like myself may be easily to follow them. I suggest that something should be done to relieve this difficult situation. At present what happens is that when Honourable Dr. Ambedkar gets up, and proposes a new clause, it has a paralysing effect on the House. The majority are not in a position to understand it, and it is passed as a matter of course. Sometimes after general discussions has begun, Dr. Ambedkar has proposed an amendment and even that has been accepted. If it is the desire that the Members should only hear what he says and must agree as a matter of courtesy, then it is all right. But I contend that every Member has a duty to follow what is happening.

Mr. President: I am afraid this complaint of the honourable Member is not justified. Notice of this particular amendment was given as long ago as the 28th May which is nearly a fortnight ago, and this has been taken up after the pretty long discussion which we had day before yesterday about the nature of these amendments. I do not think any Member has been taken by surprise particularly with regard to these articles where there is a fundamental change of procedure suggested.

Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad: I cited these articles by way of illustration only. We are given every day absolutely new ideas. We are faced with amendments which are nothing other than new ideas. I protest against this tendency, which is not a little confusing and inconvenient to Members. It is not easy for all the Members to follow these changes. This is not by way of complaining against these present amendments only, but everyday new ideas are given and they are changed from day to day, and at the last minute something is proposed and we have automatically to agree to it. I contend that what I say is not to delay matters but to facilitate matters. These are inconveniences felt by some Members and I have ventured to come here and place them before you.

Mr. President: When we are considering the Constitution, we cannot altogether rule out new ideas. Changes are bound to occur from time to time and whenever they do occur, we have to take note of them. Therefore the Chair has reserved to itself the right to allow amendments even at a later stage, if it thinks that an amendment is such that it requires consideration. If there is any complaint from any Member that time should be allowed to consider any particular amendment, it shall always be considered. So far as these particular amendments are concerned, I think we have had enough time to consider them.

Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad: I simply submit that something should be done to stop this tendency or as least to allow Members time to follow them. This is only by way of a general complaint. There is now-a-days a

tendency to submit new amendments which are in the nature of changing the Constitution itself. This tendency is rather confusing and very inconvenient to Members. I never suggested anything about your ruling. That is a recognition of the need for changes, but I am really feeling myself hopeless about the way these amendments are coming in. If they were one or two isolated cases, it would have been different, but new amendments to the Constitution itself has because the rule.

Shri T. T. Krishnamachari (Madras: General): Mr. President, Sir, this amendments to substitute a new article for article 94 has been fully dealt with by Dr. Ambedkar in his speech day before yesterday while outlining the nature and scope of the changes that the Drafting Committee have sought to make in the scheme of financial control. He made it every plain that this suggestion of an Appropriation Bill is to substitute the authentication of the President, a practice which has been followed all along for reasons totally different from what we have in mind about the new set up of the Constitution of this country. Sir, it must also be understood that there has been no vital change in the procedure. Dr. Ambedkar was at great pains to explain to the House that the changes made are such that they are only enabling provisions, to give power, to the Parliament if it so desires, to make changes in the scheme of financial control and in the discussion of the budget and the procedure to be followed thereon, and very rightly he has drawn attention to the new article that is proposed, viz., 98-A, whereby Parliament would have the complete right and freedom to do what it likes in regard to the laying down of any procedure if it so wishes. The article before the House involves merely a change in the nomenclature rather than one of substance. Instead of the President authenticating the decisions arrived at when the voting on demands is carried on in the House, the House will take upon itself the duty by making the executive present the whole set of decisions in a concrete form which it will then approve, and the rules with regard to the discussion on such an Appropriation Bill will be made by Parliament of by the Speaker of the House until Parliament itself makes the rules. Sir, I fail to appreciate the basis, the validity of the complaint made by my honorable Friend, Mr. Santhanam, who, as the other speakers before him have stated, is one of the most well-informed critics of the Constitution as well as of procedure in the House and who had been taking a lot of interest in the budget activities in the Parliament before his elevation to the Ministry. His objection apparently was not fundamental, though he failed to see the necessity for an amendment of this nature. He did not raise any fundamental objection to the changes sought to be made by the Drafting Committee. Sir, the objection that he raised to clause (3) of article 94, which enables the operation of article 95 and 96 that follow hereafter arises, in my view, from an imperfect understanding of the scheme.

Article 95, Sir, if the House will permit me to explain briefly and anticipate Dr. Ambedkar when he moves his amendment thereon, combines two functions allowed to the executive, one of which the Parliament would approve of later, that is, after the event. Actually, either in approving of supplementary or in approving of excess grants made, the Parliament or any Legislature always dealt with a situation after the fact. It was definitely an ex-post facto decision. My honourable Friend, Mr. Santhanam says: "you want to tighten up the procedure. Why do you allow the executive to incur expenditure and then come to the Parliament for approval, to make a deviation in the estimates, in the demands passed and the estimates approved of by the House and then come to the Parliament for approval thereafter?"

The Honourable Shri K Santhanam: I was not objecting to expenditure, but to the demand cut of the Consolidated Fund.

Shri. T. T. Krishnamachari: I am coming to that point. In fact it is an extremely

pedantic way of looking at a simple fact. The sanction of the expenditure, the entering into a commitment and the payment of money in discharge of the commitment are all one and the same action. You cannot ask the Government to enter into a commitment and say, well, the Parliament will not pay, after the Government had entered in to a commitment. It means a Government which cannot persuade a Parliament to honour a commitment that they had made by paying the moneys due under that commitment will have to go out of office as it has thereby ceased to command the confidence of Parliament. I am rather surprised that a Minister of Government who will be a daily facet perhaps when he rises to a position of greater responsibility than the one that he now occupies and would find himself in a peculiar position when he makes a commitment for an expenditure which the Parliament may or may not permit him to fulfill, should say that he should not be permitted to incur the expenditure until Parliament approves of the Scheme and thereafter allows him to put out the money for the purpose. It really means that a commitment made by a member of Government is absolutely worthless and if the Parliament really refuses to pay, it means, he ceases to have the confidence of the Parliament. But apart from that, the idea really in this new scheme is not to make a radical alteration from the existing scheme that Dr. Ambedkar already made mention of and I repeated it the day before yesterday. We do not want to put the Government into a straitjacket; we have assured the House more than once that the idea is not to make a serious departure from what obtains now and thereby embarrass the Government, but at the same time make enough provision so that if the Parliament of the future wants to exercise greater control, they can do so. There is one aspect in regard to the new articles, both 95 and 96 that are to be moved by Dr. Ambedkar hereafter, which is covered by clause (3), and that is a certain amount of initiative is to be left to the executive in this matter. That initiative might however, be curtailed by frequent meetings of Parliament, by the executive realising their responsibility and placing demand for large amounts of expenditure, if they have the reason to incur it, before the Parliament in the form of a supplementary budget. Sir, the Members of this House spoke of supplementary demands covering a large amount of over Rs. 100 crores having been passed by this House acting in the other Chamber during the last Budget session. I quite agree that it is something which is not correct. In proportion to our total Governmental expenditure, Rs. 100 crores is something very big. The only way in which the House could have made the Government come before them before the bulk of the expenditure was incurred was by compelling Government to present a supplementary budget,--if things had happened in a way that it had exceeded the best anticipations of Government in regard to expenditure. Even here, the procedure outlined in article 96, namely a Vote of Credit might partially serve as a means of obtaining approval of Parliament in the future. If the Government feel that they have to incur expenditure of a character which they did not anticipate, a new war or an increased expenditure in a war they are carrying on, they might always go to the House and ask for a Vote of Credit. That is the procedure that has been made possible by the new set of amendments that are to be moved and that is the only type of control that the Parliament can exercise. The provision envisaged by clause (3), namely article 95 and 96, is put in any scheme of Financial provisions if the intention is that the Government is to carry on the Government of the day and the control that the Parliament might ultimately exercise is only by an understanding with the executive that the executive limits its expenditure up to a particular amount and for increased

expenditure the convention has to be established that the Government will go before Parliament with a supplementary budget. If clause (3) is

taken away, then article 95 becomes inoperative and I would at once point out be my honourable Friend Mr. Santhanam that it would make it impossible for the Government to be carried on without the Parliament sitting practically every day, so that Government can go to Parliament as and when occasion arises and say; "We have made this excess expenditure; this is unforeseen expenditure, please grant it, or else we will go out of office." The Honourable Mr. Santhanam's objection might be due to his dislike of the corollary to this scheme, namely, that Parliament will have to sit for a longer duration, probably three or four or six months, which he does not like. I am afraid, Sir, that thought it is not my intention to disprove the validity of anything that Mr. Santhanam has said, I think it is my duty being particeps criminis in making the suggestions that have been put before the House in regard to the changes in the financial structure that this House.........

The Honourable Shri K Santhanam: On a point of personal explanation; I made no such speech.

Shri T. T. Krishnamachari: And the public at large will have to be assured that the idea of these amendments is not to embarrass the Government, the idea is not to make the Government impossible, but merely to allow Parliament both by convention and rules of procedure to tighten up their control on expenditure generally. Sir, I trust there will be no need for any further explanation and the House will pass the amendment of Dr. Ambedkar without further discussion.

Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena: Mr. President, Sir, I only wish to draw the attention of the House to clause (2) of the new article 94 and I would request Dr. Ambedkar to explain the need of this clause in this article. This clause (2) says: No. amendment shall be proposed to any such Bill in either House of Parliament which will have the effect of varying the amount or altering the destination of any grant so made or of varying the amount of any expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, and the decision of the person presiding as to the amendments which are admissible under this clause shall be final." Such a clause does not find a place in the constitution of England; of course, their constitution is unwritten. I feel that this could have been left to the conventions of the House or to the rules to be made by Parliament for itself. But, if it is put in the Constitution, it puts a limitation on the sovereignty of Parliament. Although what is contemplated is that the Estimates will be scrutinised in the Committee of Supplies and the Committee of Ways and Means and an Appropriation Bill will be framed on the decisions of the Committee of Supplies and Committee of Ways and Means, actually, there will not be any necessity for varying the items in the Appropriation Bill. But, suppose some Government does not frame the Appropriation Bill in accordance with the recommendations of the committee of Supplies and the Committee of Ways and Means, then, there is no provision left for the members of the House to bring forward amendments to bring it in conformity with the decisions of these committees. I therefore think that this should not be a provision in the Constitution, but should be left to the rules or the conventions of the House so that on such occasions, the House may bring to the notice of the Government that they have not carried out the proposals agreed upon by the Committee of Supplies and the Committee of Ways and Means. That, I hope, would be much healthier. I would request Dr. Ambedkar to explain what is the real need of putting this clause in the Constitution.

Mr. Mahboob Ali Baig Sahib: (Madras: Muslim): Sir, I will confine myself to article 94 and the amendment moved by Dr. Ambedkar, to the new article.

The difference between the proposed amendment and the original article is this: whereas in the original article the grants made by the House of the People will have to be authenticated by the President, according to this amendment, an Appropriation Bill will be moved before the House of the

People and passed. That is the only difference that I find. In his introductory speech, Dr. Ambedkar said that in the past the Governor-General used to authenticate the expenditure granted by the Assembly for several reasons. He had to act in his discretion and in his individual judgment and therefore it was necessary that this table of expenditure approved by the Assembly should go before him so that he may make any changes it he pleases. These circumstances do not exist now; although the President is there as the executive head, it is more appropriate and more democratic that the House of the People should approve the table of expenditure which it has granted. That is the argument advanced by him. I entirely agree with him that the President or any executive head should not authenticate the expenditure, but it is the House of the People only that should do it. the question is whether an Appropriation Bill is necessary and what is the purpose of this Appropriation Bill. If it is merely to authenticate the several grants that have been made by the House of the People, why should there be an Appropriation Bill? As stated in clause (2) of this amendment, no amendment shall be proposed to the Bill, and no changes could be proposed in the matter of the expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund. What is the purpose, then, I ask, of having an Appropriation Bill brought before the House of the People? If you want that after the grants have been made by the House, a table of the grants should be placed before the House, I agree. This Schedule of expenditure will be approved by the House automatically. It is a mere formality. Whereas in the case of the Governor-General, he had the right to interfere in his discretion and in his individual judgment, now there is no scope for that at all. It is merely a formality to place the Schedule of grants that are made by the House from day to day, and get it sanctioned. The House passes that Schedule automatically. Therefore, I do not see any reason why this Appropriation Bill should be brought before the House at all. If you want to call it an Appropriation Bill, because some other Governments have called it an Appropriation Bill, it is just an unnecessary thing. That can be done by stating that instead of the President, the House of the People will authenticate the schedule of expenditure granted by a certain date; that would be enough. Therefore, Sir, my submission is that it serves no useful purpose at all, as Mr. Santhanam put it. It will serve no useful purpose because, when this Appropriation Bill is brought before the House the House cannot move any amendment to that and cannot change the expenditure charged to the Consolidated Fund. Therefore, I say, why go through this process of placing an Appropriation Bill before the House? It is just enough to say that the Schedule of expenditure granted by the House of the People will be laid before the House of the People, which must be considered to have been authenticated. If necessary, the signature of the Speaker of the House of the People authenticating that these items have been passed by the House of the People is enough. Therefore, my submission is that the manner in which the article has been re-drafted is unnecessary and that appropriate changes should be made with regard to this matter and that it is quite enough to say that thy schedule of expenditure granted by the House should be placed before the House of the People and it should be deemed to have been authenticated. Sir, I am not now referring to any matters that are going to be moved under article 95 and 96. I reserve may remarks thereon.

Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi: Mr. President,. Sir, my Friend Mr. Santhanam's point, in my opinion, certainly requires clarification. Clause (3) reads :-

"Subject to the provisions of the next two succeeding articles no money shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund of India except under appropriation made by law passed in accordance with the provisions of this article."

Article 96 relates to three categories of votes,

votes on account, votes on credit and exceptional grants. In these three cases Parliament authorises such expenditure; and therefore so far article 96 goes, I think we can have no objection to that being mentioned in this. As for article 95, it allows for what are known as supplementary grant and excess grants. The whole point of his contention and the whole matter is that we do not want to give the executive power to spend money over and above what Parliament has granted. Clause (a) of 95 says :-

"if at any time the executive finds that a sum granted is found to be insufficient- that is No. 1-and also if there is any new service not contemplated at the time of the passing of the Budget-then in such a contingency the President shall cause to be laid before both the Houses of Parliament another statement showing the estimated amount of that expenditure, etc."

The words 'estimated expenditure' show that the expenditure may not be actually incurred but they are able to foresee the possibility of an expenditure and it is likely that they will come forward to Parliament and say "The amount granted by you is not sufficient and we want a little or more or there is a new service which was not contemplated at the time of passing the Budget and therefore we want more money". That is a supplementary grant which may be allowed. It is clause (b) of No. 95 which Mr. Santhanam takes exception to viz., if money has been spent on any services during the financial year in excess of the amount granted for that service and for that year. In fact last year there was a great argument in the Legislative Assembly that a sum of the over 100 crores without any authorisation had been spent. I want to ask Dr. Ambedkar if it is not possible for the executive to spend any amount as they did last year without any specific grant by Parliament and therefore is it not giving a free latitude to the executive to spend any money in that year in excess of the grant made by Parliament during that year? Is it not against the democratic principles to allow the executive such a power? I understand in England that is not the procedure followed. Whenever the executive wants to spend an amount over and above, the officer-in-charge of disbursements informs the executive. "Well you are nearing the end of your grant and you must make provision." They are not allowed to spend a pie more than what Parliament has authorised. I see no reason why we should have any departure. It is just possible Parliament may not meet and they may have to incur the expenditure. It is equally possible they may spend crores--hundred of crores--and therefore it seems to me rather going against the fundamental principles that every amount spent must have the sanction of Parliament; and we seem to be going against that principle in allowing clause (b) of No. 95 as it stands at present. Therefore so far as 96 goes, Parliament exercises its judgment and mind and is to vote on grant but this is something in which the executive has unbridled power and I would like Dr. Ambedkar to explain this aspect of the matter.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Mr. President, Sir, l thought that the observations made by my Friend Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari would have been regarded as sufficient to meet the objections raised by my Friend Mr. Santhanam, but since my Friend Mr. Bharathi by his speech has indicated that at any rate his doubts have not been cleared, I find it necessary to rise and to make a few observations. My Friend Mr. Santhanam said that we were unnecessary borrowing the procedure of an Appropriation Bill and that the existing procedure of an authenticated schedule should have been sufficient for our purposes. His argument if I understood him correctly was this: that an Appropriation Bill is necessary in the House of Commons because the supply estimates are dealt with by a committee of the whole House and not by the House itself. Consequently the Appropriation Bill is, in his opinion,

A necessary concomitant of a procedure of estimates being dealt with by a sort of Committee of the

House. Personally, I think there is no connection between the Committee procedure of the House Commons and the necessity an Appropriation Bill . I might tell the House as to how this procedure of the House of Commons going into a Committee of Supply to deal with the estimates came into being. The House will remember that there was a time in English political history when the King and the House of Commons were at loggerheads. There was not such pleasant feeling of trust and confidence which exists now today between the House of Commons and the King. The King was regarded as a tyrant, as an oppressor, as a person interested in levying taxes and spending them in the way in which he wanted. It was also regarded that the Speaker of the House of Commons instead of being a person chosen by the House of Commons enjoying the confidence of the House of Commons was regarded as a spy of the King. Consequently, the members of the House of Commons always feared that if the whole House discussed the estimates the Speaker who had a right to preside when the House as a whole met in session would in all probability, to secure the favour of the King, report the names of the members of the House to the King who critisised the King's conduct, his wastefulness, his acts of tyranny. In order therefore to get rid of the Speaker who was, as I said in the beginning, regarded as a spy of the King carrying tales of what happened in the House of Commons to the King, they devised this procedure of going into a committee; because when the House met in Committee the Speaker had no right to preside. That was the main object why the House of Commons met in Committee of Supply. As I said, even if the House did not meet in Committee of Supply, it would have been necessary for the House to pass an Appropriation Bill. As my friend--at least the lawyer friends-will remember, there was a time when the House of Commons merely passed resolutions in committee of Ways and Means to determine the taxes that may be levied, and consequently the taxes were levied for a long time--I think up to 1913-- on the basis of mere resolutions passed by the House of Commons Committee of Ways and Means. In 1913 this question was taken to a Court of law whether taxes could be levied merely on the basis of resolutions passed by the House of Commons in the Committee of Ways and Means, and the High Court declared that the House of Commons had no right to levy taxes on the basis of mere resolutions. Parliament must pass a law in order to enable Parliament to levy taxes. Consequently, the British Parliament passed what is called a Provincial Collection of Taxes Act. I have no doubt about it that if the expenditure was voted in Committee of Supply and the resolutions of the House of Commons were to be treated as final authority, they would have also been condemned by Courts of law, because it is an established proposition that what operates is law and not resolution. Therefore my first submission is this: that the point made by my Friend Mr. Santhanam, that the Appropriation Bill procedure is somehow an integral part of the Committee procedure of the House of Commons has no foundation whatsoever. I have already submitted why the procedure of an authenticated schedule by the Governor-General is both uncalled for, having regard to the altered provision of the President who has no function in his discretion or in his individual judgment, and how in matters of finance the authority of Parliament should be supreme, and not the authority of the executive as represented by the President. I therefore need say nothing more no this point.

Then my Friend, Mr. Santhanam, said, if I understood him correctly, that article 95--I do not know whether he referred to article 96: but he certainly referred to article 95--would nullify clause (3) of the new article 94. Clause '(3) stated that no money could be spent except under an appropriation made by law. He seemed to be under the impression that supplementary, additional or excess grants which are mentioned in new article 95, and votes on account, or votes

on credit or exceptional grants mentioned in the new article 96 would be voted without an Appropriation law. I think he has not completely read the article. If he were to read sub-clause (2) of the new article 95 as well as the last part of new article 96 and also a further article which will be moved at a later stage--which is article 248A--he will see that there is a provision made that no moneys can be drawn, whether for supplementary or additional grants or for votes on account or for may purpose, without a provision made by law for drawing moneys on Consolidated Fund. I can quite understand the confusion which probably has arisen in the minds of many Members by reason of the fact that in some place we speak of a Consolidated Fund Act while in another place we speak of an Appropriation Act. The point is this: fundamentally, there is no difference between a Consolidated Fund Act and an Appropriation Act. Both have the same purpose, namely, the purpose of authorising an authority duly constituted to draw money from the Consolidated Fund. The difference between a Consolidated Fund Act and the Appropriation Act is just this. In the Consolidated Fund Act a lump sum is mentioned while in the Appropriation Act what is mentioned is all the details--the main head, the sub-heads and the items. Obviously, the procedure of an Appropriation Bill cannot be brought into operation at the stage of a Consolidated Fund Bill because Parliament has not gone through the whole process of appropriating money for heads, for sub-heads and for items included under the sub-heads. Consequently when money is voted under a Consolidated Fund Act, in means that the executive may draw so much lump sum out of the Consolidated Fund which will at a subsequent stage be shown in what is called the final Appropriation Act. If honourable Friends will remember that there is no authority given to the executive to draw money except under a Consolidated Fund Act or under an Appropriation Act, they will realize that so far as possible an attempt is made to make these provisions as fool-proof and knave-proof a one can possible do.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That for article 94, the following article be substituted:

'94. Appropriation Bill (1) As soon as may be after the grants under the last preceding article have been made by the House of the People there shall be introduced a Bill to provide for the appropriation out of the Consolidated Fund of India all moneys required to meet--

(a) the grants so made by the House of the People: and

(b) the expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India but not exceeding in any case the amount shown in the statement previously laid before Parliament.

(2) No amendment shall be proposed to any such Bill in either House of Parliament which will have the effect of varying the amount or altering the destination of any grant so made or of varying the amount of any expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, and the decision of the person presiding as to the amendments which are admissible under this clause shall be final.

(3) Subject to the provisions of the next two succeeding articles on money shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund of India except under appropriation made by law passed in accordance with the provisions of this article.'"

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That article 94, as amended, stand part of the Constitution."

The motion was adopted.

Article 94, as amended, was added to the Constitution.

*Article 95

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Sir, I move:

"That for article 95, the following article be substituted:

'95. Supplementary, additional or excess grants. (1) The President shall-

(a) if the amount authorised by any law made in accordance with the provisions of article 94 of this Constitution to be expended for a particular service for the current financial year is found to be insufficient for the purposes of that year or when a need has arisen during the current financial year for supplementary or

additional expenditure upon some new service not contemplated in the annual statement for that year; or

(b) if any money has been spent on any service during a financial year in excess of the amount granted for that service and for that year,

cause to be laid before both the Houses of Parliament another statement showing the estimated amount of that expenditure or cause to be presented to the House of the People a demand for such excess, as the case may be.

(2) The provisions of the last three preceding articles shall have effect in relation to any such statement and expenditure or demand and also to any law to be made authorising the appropriation of moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of India to meet such expenditure or the grant in respect of such demand as they have effect in relation to the annual financial statement and the expenditure mentioned therein or to a demand for a grant and the law to be made for the authorization of Appropriation of moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of India to meet such expenditure or grant'."

Shri R. K. Sidhva: Sir, I move:

"That in amendment No. 12 of List I (Fourth Week), in clause (1) of the proposed article 95--

(i) in sub-clause (a), the word 'or', occurring at the end, be deleted;

(ii) sub-clause (b) be deleted; and

(iii) at the end of clause (1), the following words be added;and until both the Houses of Parliament pass such a demand, the expenditure shall not be incurred, and if incurred payment shall not be made'."

Sir, the amendment moved by Dr. Ambedkar is in consequence of the previous articles passed. I welcome the amendment but I feel there is a flaw which requires to be remedied. The amended article would then read:

"The President shall.......... cause to be laid before both the House of Parliament another statement showing the estimated amount of that expenditure or cause to be presented to the House of the People a demand for such excess, as the case my be and until both the House of Parliament pass such a demand, the expenditure shall not be incurred, and if incurred payment shall not be made."

We are all unanimous on the point that under the new set-up a new system should be introduced, so that as regards the finances there should be a thorough check by the Parliament . At present the procedure in the Parliament is most objectionable inasmuch as supplementary grants exceeding 100 crores are brought in, which are equal to one-third of the budget amount. It is most extraordinary and because of that power which the executive have got they have been most reckless in preparing the budget.

I will give you an illustration. In the last budget estimates of income the estimates of income increased by nearly fifty crores over the estimated amount and the expenditure increased by eighty crores. All that sixty crores over and above the estimated budget amount was spent by the executive and yet there was a deficit and new taxation was proposed. This is nothing short of hoodwinking the House by presenting misleading budget statements. I am sorry I cannot use less strong language. These inflationary budget are intentionally brought before the House so as to show lesser revenue so that when the actuals are prepared they would show a deficit and if the budget is not balanced, they might propose new taxation. As I said sixty crores more were derived from revenue last year, yet eighty crores were spent over it and the budget was deficit and new taxes were proposed. There is no check on it. The executive feels that they a long rope, and that they can do what they like. Even today the Auditor-General has no right to pass a single item more than what the House has sanctioned in the budget. Yet when excess expenditure is incurred the Auditor-General goes before the Minister who tells him to pass the items and the Auditor-General puts his rubber stamp "No objection" and payments are made. This is very objectionable. There is no respect shown to the House by the executive. Is it fair? The budget has no sanctity. The budget statement is brought before the

House, the House scrutinises it and tells the executive that they shall not spend more then what the House has sanctioned and yet the executive disregard the decision of the House and go on spending money.......

Mr. President: The honourable Member seems to think that he is delivering a speech before the Legislative Assembly when the budget is under discussion. He is on the amendment and I would like him to confine himself to it, that is to the principle underlying the amendment and not to expatiate on something that happened at the time of the last budget discussion.

Shri R. K. Sidhva: I am giving only an illustration....

Mr. President: The same illustration has been given by the honourable Member more then once.

Shri R. K. Sidhva: This amendment is so important that unless our responsibility is realised I can assure you, Sir, that our whole object will be frustrated by the Constitution we are framing.

The President: If the amendment is incorporated in the Constitution that will be a sufficient safeguard and the honourable Member's speech will not be remembered.

Shri R. K. Sidhva: I was making a case as to the justification for this amendment being incorporated in the Constitution. If the matter is left to the executive there is no chance of any likely improvement.

I was referring to the constitution of the free city of Danzig. There I found almost similar provisions. No supplementary amount is to be spent unless the House authorises it. It may be argued that in the event of an emergency what would happen? I want the executive to take stock of the whole year. The emergency does not happen for the purpose of spending money to the tune of hundreds of crores. It may involve a few lakhs but I object strongly to supplementary demands to the tune of hundreds of crores. Unless my amendment is accepted the very good object with which we are providing this article will be to that extent frustrated. These articles have been healthy and sound and they will be there for our future guidance. But as regards supplementary demands unless an amendment like the one proposed by me is incorporated in the Constitution the flaw will remain there and I can assure you (I repeat it again knowing the mind of the executive) there is not going to be any improvement as far as supplementary demands are concerned.

Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena: Sir, I beg to move:

"That in amendment No. 12 of List I (Fourth Week), after clause (2) of the new article 95, the following new clause be added;

'(3) After the first Parliament elected under this Constitution comes into being, the financial year, shall commence on the first November and end with the 31st of October.'"

Sir, the new procedure which is contemplated by this new amendment intends to give Parliament more time for the scruting of the estimates on the model of the British Parliament . In the British Parliament an Appropriation Act must be passed by the end of August. That means, five months after 31st March. In England the months of April, May, June, July and August are some of the best months of the year. If our Parliament is to sit always during the there months of May, June, and July in Delhi, it will be very difficult. I therefore want that the consideration of the Budget should be taken up in the best months of the year in our country. Just as five months are allowed, after the commencement of he financial year we should also get at least five months for passing the Appropriation Act. That means November, December, January, February and March. this will bring our procedure exactly in line with the procedure in British Parliament, Sir, in our country also, the financial year generally begins with Deepavali about the beginning of November, so that the fixing of the new financial year will be in consonance with our ancient traditions. I think therefore that in order that the purpose laying behind the amendment, which is to give the House more time and full facility to scrutinise all the estimates, may be achieved, it is necessary that the Budget should be discussed form

the Deepavali to Holi, i.e., from November 1st to March 31st. I think that if these days are fixed, we shall have best portion of the year for the discussion of the Budget and passing the Appropriation Act. I hope Dr. Ambedkar will accept the amendment and spare the members of the new Parliament from having to sit in Delhi during the months of May and June as we are new doing.

Shri B. M. Gupte (Bombay: General): Sir, even after listening to the explanation given by Dr. Ambedkar I am inclined to oppose the provision in this article as far as the excess grants are concerned. I do not see how an occasion can arise for such a grant after the innovations we have made in the preceding article. It seems to me rather anomalous that after laying down a mandatory provision in one article we should provide in the next article for the regularisation of the breach of that mandatory provision. That is want it amounts to here. Perhaps the Mover of this amendment has overlooked the circumstances that have changed. I understand that this provision for excess grant ws made on the recommendation of the Expert Committee that was appointed to consider the financial provisions. It has been said so in the footnote. So it is the Expert Committee that has proposed that such a provisions should be made. I submit that the entire basis of the recommendation of the Expert Committee has been changed now by the proposals we have already adopted. I will invite attention to paragraph 79 of the report.

"It is usual in democratic constitutions to provide that no money can be drawn from the Treasury except on the authority of the legislature by an Act of Appropriation, but in this country the particle has been to authorise expenditure by resolutions of Government after the payments have been made and not by law. As the existing practice has been working well in this country appropriation by law does not appear to be necessary."

So they definitely rejected the idea of an Appropriation Act which we have now adopted. That is one fundamental change that we have made. Formerly the Auditor-General could withdraw the amount in spite of the fact that it was not sanctioned by Parliament , because it was the executive that authenticated the Schedule. Now we have made a stringent provision by saying that it shall be done by an Act of Parliament. So, what the Auditor-General will now have to do is to defy an act of Parliament.

Another fundamental change we have made is this. The Expert Committee contemplated that the old system will continue. They took it for granted that the wording that is in the Government of India Act will also be maintained. I shall invite the attention of the House to the corresponding provision in the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted. Section 35 says:

"Provided that, subject to the next succeeding section, no expenditure the revenues of the Dominion shall be deemed to be duly authorised unless it is specified in the schedule so authenticated."

So the present wording is that only that expenditure shall not be considered as authorised--not that 'no money shall be withdrawn'. We have made the wording especially stringent in article 94. So, under the Government of India Act as long as the Auditor-General was confident that the executive would get the sanction of Parliament later on, there was no objection for him to withdraw the amount. But here under article 94 (3) he will have no power to do this unless he infringes the Appropriation Act of Parliament. I submit that it is not only that this provision about excess grant is inconsistent with clause (3) of article 94, but that it is hostile to the spirit of stricter control by Parliament of the finances of the country. I therefore submit that the point may be reconsidered whether the excess grant provision should be retained.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Mr. President, Sir, I find that the financial provision which are placed this House have given considerable worry to the Members. I can appreciate that, for I remember that when, Mr. Churchill's father became the

Lard Chancellor, a budget was placed before him showing figures in decimals and dots thereon. Evidently he was not a student of mathematics and could not understand what the figure meant with a dot in it. So he wrote on the file, "What do these damned dots mean? "asking for an explanation from the Secretary of the Finance Department. Having regard to such difficulty of understanding from persons so highly placed as Mr. Churchill's father. I am not at all surprised of the Members of this House also find similar difficulty in understanding these provisions. I should therefore in a right frame of mind.

Sir, I should like to tell the House the effect of the Provisions contained an article 92, article 93 (2) and article 94. Article 92 places upon the President the obligation to day before Parliament a financial statement for the year--I would like to emphasize the words " for the year"__ showing the expenditure in certain categories, those charged on the revenues of India and those not charged on the revenues of India. After that is done, then comes into operation article 93 (2), which states how the estimates are to be dealt with. It says that the estimates shall be presented to the House in the form of demands and shall be voted upon by the House of the People. After that work is done, article 94 comes into operation, the new article 94 which says that all these grants made by the House of the People shall be put and regularised in the form of an Appropriation Act. now, I would like to ask the Members to consider what the effect is of articles, 92, 93 (2) and 94. Suppose we did not enact any other article, what would be the effect? The effect of the provisions contained in article, 92, 93 (2) and 94 in my judgment would be that the President would not be in a position constitutionally to present before Parliament any other estimates during the course of the year. Those are the only estimates which the President could present according to law. That would mean that there would be no provision for submitting supplementary grants, supplementary demands, excess grants or the other grants which have been referred to such as votes on credit and things of that sort. if no provision was made for the presentation of supplementary grants and the other grants to which I have referred, the whole business of the executive would be held up. Therefore, while enacting the general provision that the President shall be bound to present the estimates of expenditure for that particular year before parliament, he is also authorised by law to submit other estimates if the necessity for those estimates arises. Unless therefore we make an express provision in the Constitution for the presentation of supplementary and excess grants, article 92, 93 (2) and 94 would debar any such presentation. The House will now understand why it is necessary to make that provision for the presentation of these supplementary demands.