XII LOK SABHA DEBATES,   Session II, (Budget) 

Wednesday,May 27, 1998 / Jyaistha 6, 1920 (Saka)



Type of Debate: PAPERS LAID ON THE TABLE

Title:	Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee laid a paper entiled "Evolution of India's
Nuclear Policy".

TEXT :
 
1.	On  11 May, a statement was issued by Government announcing that India
had successfully carried out three underground nuclear tests  at  the  Pokhran
range.   Two  days  later, after carrying out two more underground sub-kiloton
tests, the Government announced the completion of the planned series of tests.
The three underground nuclear tests carried out at 1545 hours on 11  May  were
with  three  different  devices  -  a  fission device, a low-yield sub-kiloton
device and a thermonuclear device.  The two tests carried out at 1221 hours on
13 May were also low-yield devices in the sub-kiloton range.  The results from
these tests have been in accordance with the expectations of our scientists.

2.	In 1947, when India emerged as a free country  to  take  its  rightful
place  in  the  comity  of  nations,  the  nuclear age had already dawned. Our
leaders then took the crucial decision to opt for self-reliance,  and  freedom
of  thought  and  action. We rejected the Cold War paradigm whose shadows were
already appearing on the horizon and instead of aligning ourselves with either
bloc, chose the more difficult path of non-alignment. This  has  required  the
building  up  of  national  strength through our own resources, our skills and
creativity and the dedication of the people.  Among the  earliest  initiatives
taken by our first Prime Minister Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, was the development of
science  and  inculcation of the scientific spirit. It is this initiative that
laid the foundation for the achievement of 11 and 13  May,  made  possible  by
exemplary  cooperation  among  the scientists from Department of Atomic energy
and Defence Research & Development  Organisation.  Disarmament  was  then  and
continues  to  be a major plank in our foreign policy now. It was, in essence,
and remains still, the natural course for a country that had  waged  a  unique
struggle for independence on the basis of 'ahimsa' and 'Satyagraha'.

______________________________________________________________________________

*	Also placed in Library See No.  LT 173/98)


3.	Development  of  nuclear  technology  transformed the nature of global
security.  Our leaders reasoned that nuclear weapons were not weapons of  war,
these were  weapons  of  mass destruction.  A nuclear-weapon-free-world would,
therefore, enhance not only India's security but  also  the  security  of  all
nations.  This  is  the principle plank of our nuclear policy.  In the absence
of universal and non-discriminatory disarmament, we  cannot  accept  a  regime
that creates  an arbitrary division between nuclear haves and havenots.  India
believes that it is the sovereign right of every nation to  make  a  judgement
regarding  its  supreme  national interests and exercise its sovereign choice.
We subscribe to the principle of equal and legitimate  security  interests  of
nations and  consider  it  a  sovereign  right.  At the same time, our leaders
recognised early that  nuclear  technology  offers  tremendous  potential  for
economic development, especially for developing countries who are endeavouring
to  leap  across  the  technology  gaps  created  by  long  years  of colonial
exploitation.  This thinking was reflected in  the  enactment  of  the  Atomic
Energy Act  of  1948,  within  a  year  of our independence.  All the numerous
initiatives taken by us since, in the field of nuclear disarmament  have  been
in harmony and in continuation of those early enunciation.

4.	In the 50's, nuclear weapons testing took place above ground  and  the
characteristic  mushroom  cloud  became the visible symbol of the nuclear age.
India then took the lead in calling for an end to all nuclear  weapon  testing
as the  first step for ending the nuclear arms race.  Addressing the Lok Sabha
on 2 April, 1954, shortly after a major hydrogen bomb test had been conducted,
Pt.  Jawaharlal Nehru stated that "nuclear, chemical and biological energy and
power should not be used to forge weapons of mass destruction".  He called for
negotiations for prohibition and elimination of nuclear  weapons  and  in  the
interim, a  standstill  agreement  to  halt nuclear testing.  The world had by
then witnessed less than 65 tests.  Our call was not  heeded.    In  1963,  an
agreement was concluded to ban atmospheric testing but by this time, countries
had  developed  the  technologies for conducting underground nuclear tests and
the nuclear arms race continued unabated.  More than three decades passed  and
after  over 2000 tests had been conducted, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was
opened for signature in 1996, following two and a half years  of  negotiations
in which  India  had  participated  actively.  In its final shape, this Treaty
left much to be desired.  It was neither comprehensive nor was it  related  to
disarmament.

5.	In  1965, along with a small group of non-aligned countries, India had
put forward the idea of an  international  non-proliferation  agreement  under
which the nuclear weapon states would agree to give up their arsenals provided
other countries  refrained  from  developing  or acquiring such weapons.  This
balance  of   rights   and   obligations   was   absent   when   the   Nuclear
Non-Proliferation  Treaty(NPT)  emerged  in  1968, almost 30 years ago. In the
60's our security concerns deepened. But such was our  abhorrence  of  nuclear
weapons  and  such  our  desire  to  avoid acquiring them that we souglaustead
security guarantees from major nuclear powers of the world. The  countries  we
turned  to  for  support  and  understanding  felt  unable to extend to us the
assurances that we then sought. That is when and  why  India  made  clear  its
inability to sign the NPT.

6.	The Lok  Sabha  debated  the  NPT  on  5  April, 1968.  The then Prime
Minister, late Smt.  Indira Gandhi assured the House that "we shall be  guided
entirely   by  our  self-enlightenment  and  the  considerations  of  national
security". She highlighted the shortcomings of the  NPT  whilst  reemphasising
the  country's commitment to nuclear disarmament. She warned the House and the
country "that not signing the Treaty may bring the nation  many  difficulties.
It may mean the stoppage of aid and stoppage of help. Since we are taking this
decision  together,  we must all be together in facing its consequences". That
was a turning  point.  This  House  then  strengthened  the  decision  of  the
Government by reflecting a national consensus.

7.	Our  decision  not  to  sign  the  NPT  was  in keeping with the basic
objective of  maintaining  freedom  of  thought  and  action.    In  1974,  we
demonstrated our  nuclear  capability.  Successive Governments thereafter have
continued to take all  necessary  steps  in  keeping  with  that  resolve  and
national will, to safeguard India's nuclear option.  This was also the primary
reason  underlying  the  1996  decision  in the country not subscribing to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty  (CTBT);  a  decision  that  met  the  unanimous
approval of  the House yet again.  Our perception then was that subscribing to
the CTBT would severely limit India's nuclear potential at an unacceptably low
level.  Our reservations deepened as the CTBT did not also carry  forward  the
nuclear disarmament  process.    On  both  counts,  therefore,  yet  again our
security concerns remained  unaddressed.    The  then  Minister  for  External
Affairs,  shri  I.K  Gujral  had made clear the Government's reasoning to this
House during the discussions on this subject in 1996.

8.	The decades of the 80's  and  90's  meanwhile  witnessed  the  gradual
deterioration  of  our security environment as a result of nuclear and missile
proliferation. In  our  neighbourhood,  nuclear  weapons  increased  and  more
sophisticated delivery systems were inducted. Further, in our region there has
come  into  existence  a  pattern  about  clandestine  acquisition  of nuclear
materials, missiles and related technologies. India, in  this  period,  became
the   victim   of  externally  aided  and  abetted  terrorism,  militancy  and
clandestine war through hired mercenaries.

9.	The end of the Cold War marks a watershed in the history of  the  20th
century.  While  it  has transformed the political landscape of Europe, it has
done little to address India's security concerns. The relative order that  was
arrived at the Europe was not replicated in other parts of the globe.

10.	At  the  global  level,  there  is  no evidence yet on the part of the
nuclear weapon states to  take  decisive  and  irreversible  steps  in  moving
towards  a  nuclear-weapon-free-world.  Instead,  the  NPT  has  been extended
indefinitely  and  unconditionally,  perpetuating  the  existence  of  nuclear
weapons  in  the hands of the five countries who are also permanent members of
the UN Security Council. Some of these countries have  doctrines  that  permit
the  first  use  of  nuclear  weapons;  these  countries  are  also engaged in
programmes for modernisation of their nuclear arsenals.

11.	Under such  circumstances,  India was left with little choice.  It had
to take necessary steps to ensure that the country's nuclear option, developed
and safeguarded over  decades  not  be  permitted  to  erode  by  a  voluntary
self-imposed restraint.      Indeed,   such  an  erosion  would  have  had  an
irremediably adverse impact on our security.  The Government  was  thus  faced
with a  difficult  decision.   The only touchstone that guided it was national
security.  Tests conducted on 11 and 13 May are a continuation of the policies
set into motion that put  this  country  on  the  path  of  self-reliance  and
independence of  thought  and action.  Nevertheless, there are certain moments
when the chosen path reaches a fork and a decision has to be made.   1968  was
one such moment in our nuclear chapter as wer 1974 and 1996.  At each of these
moments,  we took the right decision guided by national interest and supported
by nationaal consensus.  1998 was borne in the crucible of  earlier  decisions
and made possible only because those decisions had been taken correctly in the
past and in time.

12.	At a time when developments in the area of advanced  technologies  are
taking  place  at  a  breathtaking pace, new parameters need to be identified,
tested and validated in order to ensure that skills  remain  contemporary  and
succeeding  generations  of  scientists and engineers are able to build on the
work done by their predecessors.  The limited series of five tests  undertaken
by Indian  was  precisely  such  an  exercise.    It  has  achieved its stated
objective.  The data provided by these  tests  is  critical  to  validate  our
capabilities  in  the  design  of  nuclear  weapons  of  different  yields for
different applications and different delivery systems.  Further,  these  tests
have  significantly  enhanced the capabilities of our scientists and engineers
in  computer  simulation  of  new  designs  and  enabled  them  to   undertake
sub-critical experiments  in  future,  if  considered  necessary.  In terms of
technical  capability,  our  scientists  and  engineers  have  the   requisite
resources to ensure a credible deterrent.

13.	Our  policies towards our neighbours and other countrties too have not
changed; India  remains  fully  committed  to  the  promotion  of  peace  with
stability, and resolution of all outstanding issues through bilateral dialogue
and negotiations.    These  tests were not directed against any country; these
were intended to reassure the people of India about their security and  convey
determination  that  this  Government,  like  previous  Governments,  has  the
capability and resolve to safeguard their national security  interests.    The
Government  will  continue  to remain engaged in substantive dialogue with our
neighbours to improve relations and to expand the scope of our interactions in
a mutually advantageous manner.  Confidence building is a continuous  process;
we remain  committed  to  it.    Consequent upon the tests and arising from an
insufficient appreciation of our security concerns, some countries  have  been
persuaded to  take steps that sadden us. We value our bilateral relations.  We
remain committed  to  dialogue  and  reaffirm  that  preservation  of  India's
security create no conflict of interest with these countries.

14.	India is  a  nuclear  weapon  state.  This is a reality that cannot be
denied.  It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to
grant.  It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers.   It
is India's  due,  the  right  of  one-sixth  of  human-kind.  Our strengthened
capability adds  to  our  sense  of  responsibility;  the  responsibility  and
obligation of  power.    India, mindful of its international obligation, shall
not use these weapons to commit aggression or to  mount  threats  against  any
country;  these  are weapons of self-defence and to ensure that in turn, India
is also not subjected to nuclear  threats  or  coercion.    In  1994,  we  had
proposed  that India and Pakistan jointly undertake not to be the first to use
their nuclear capability against each other.  The Government on this occasion,
reiterates its readiness to  discuss  a  "no-first-use"  agreement  with  that
country.   As also with other countries bilaterally, or in a collevtive forum.
India shall not engage in an arms race.  India shall  also  not  subscribe  or
reinvent the  doctrines of the Cold War.  India remains committed to the basic
tenet of our foreign policy- a conviction that global elimination  of  nuclear
weapons  will  enhance  its security as well as that of the rest of the world.
It will continue to urge countries, particularly other nuclear  weapon  states
to adopt measures that would contribute meaningfully to such an objective.

15.	A number of initiatives have been taken in the past.  In  1978,  India
proposed  negotiations for an international convention that would prohibit the
use or threat of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.  This  was  followed
by another initiative in 1982 caling for `nuclear freeze`- a prohibitaktion on
production  of fissile materials for weapons, on production of nuclear weapons
and related delivery systems.  In 1988, we put  forward  an  Action  Plan  for
phased elimination  of  all nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.  It
is our regret that these proposal did not receive  a  positive  response  from
other weapon  states.    Had their response been positive, India need not have
gone for the current tests.  This is where our approach to nuclear weapons  is
doctrine.  It is marked by restraint and striving for the total elimination of
all weapons of mass destruction.

16.	We  will  continue  to support such initiatives, taken individually or
collectively by the Non-Aligned Movement which has  continued  to  attach  the
highest priority  to  nuclear disarmament.  This was reaffirmed most recently,
last week, at  the  NAM  Ministerial  meeting  held  at  Cartagena  which  has
"reiterated  their  call on the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as the
highest priority, an ad hoc committee to  start  in  1998  negotiations  on  a
phased  programme  for  the  complete  elimination  of  nuclear weapons with a
specified framwork of time, including  a  Nuclear  Weapons  Convention.    The
collective  voice  of 113 NAM countries reflects an approach to global nuclear
disarmament to which India has remained committed.   One  of  the  NAM  member
initiatives  to  which  we  attach  great  importance was the reference to the
International Court of Justice resulting in the unanimous declaration from the
ICJ, as part of the Advisory Opinion handed down on 8 July 1996,  that  "there
exists  an  obligation  to  pursue  in  good  faith  and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its  aspects  under  strict
and effective  international  control".    India was one of the countries that
appealed to the ICJ on  this  issue.    No  other  nuclear  weapon  state  has
supported this  judgement;  in  fact, they have sought to decry its value.  We
have been and will continue to be in the forefront of the  calls  for  opening
negotiations  for  a Nuclear Weapons Convention, so that this challenge can be
dealt with in the same manner that we have dealt with the scourge of two other
weapons of mass destruction-through the Biological Weapons Convention and  the
Chemical Weapons Convention.  In keeping with our commitment to comprehensive,
universal  and  non-discriminatory  approaches  to  disarmament,  India  is an
original State Party to both  these  Conventions.    Accordingly,  India  will
shortly  submit  the  plan  of  destruction  of  its  chemical  weapons to the
international authority-Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical  Weapons.
We fulfil our obligations whenever we undertake them.

17.	Traditionally,  India  has been an outward looking country. Our strong
commitment to multilateralism is reflected  in  our  active  participation  in
organisations  like  the  United Nations. In recent years, in keeping with the
the  Indian  Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation and as a member of
the ASEAN Regional Forum. This engagement will also continue. The policies  of
economic liberalisation introduced in recent years have increased our regional
and global linkages and the Government shall deepen and strengthen these ties.

18.	Our nuclear  policy has been marked by restraint and openness.  It has
not violated any international agreements either in 1974 or now, in 1998.  Our
concerns have been made known to our  interlocuters  in  recent  years.    The
restraint  exercised for 24 years, after having demonstrated our capability in
1974, is in itself a unique example.  Restraint, however, has  to  arise  from
strength.  It  cannot  be  based upon indecision or doubt.  Restraint is valid
only when doubts are removed.  The series of tests undertaken  by  India  have
led  to the removal of doubts. The action involved was balanced in that it was
the minimum necessary to maintain what is  an  irreducible  component  of  our
national  security  calculus. This Government's decision has, therefore, to be
seen as part of a tradition of restraint that has characterised our policy  in
the past 50 years.

19.	Subsequent to the tests Government has already stated that India  will
now  observe  a  voluntary  moratorium and refrain from conducting underground
nuclear test explosions.  It has also indicated willingness to move towards  a
de-jure formalisation  of  this declaration.  The basic obligation of the CTBT
are thus met; to refrain from  undertaking  nuclear  test  explosions.    This
voluntary declaration is intended to convey to the international community the
seriousnes of our intent for meaningful engagement.  Subsequent decisions will
be taken after assuring ourselves of the security needs of the country.

20.	India has also indicated readiness to participate in  negotiations  in
the  Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
The basic objective of this treaty is to prohibit future production of fissile
materials for use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive  devices.    India's
approach in these negotiations will be to ensure that this treaty emerges as a
universal  and  non-discriminatory treaty, backed by an effective verification
mechanism.  When we embark on these negotiations, it  shall  be  in  the  full
confidence  of the adequacy and credibility of the nation's weaponised nuclear
deterrent.




[NEXT PAGE]